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SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY:  WHY NOW AND 
WHY NOT IN THE IMF 
Molly Ryan* 
 
As the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis that began in 2009 continues to 
run its course, leaving massive economic dislocation in its wake, and as 
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina makes its way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, this Note discusses the timely and persistent problem of 
sovereign debt crises and the many impediments to their orderly resolution.  
This Note evaluates various proposals for dealing with sovereign debt–
crisis resolution and concludes that a multilateral treaty–based sovereign 
bankruptcy regime, institutionally independent from the International 
Monetary Fund, offers the best solution. 
The status quo—messy, inefficient, and unpredictable ad hoc 
negotiations—has consistently proven inadequate.  Ex ante contractual 
devices and piecemeal statutory fixes in domestic law offer at best 
incremental solutions that can do little to alter the fundamental problems 
with the present state of affairs.  Just as domestic bankruptcy law 
complements the law of creditor remedies due to the shortcomings of the 
latter, so too should a system of international bankruptcy law complement 
the law of creditor remedies vis-à-vis sovereign debtors.  This Note argues 
that, although this approach may be difficult to achieve, that does not 
justify abandoning it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, Greece executed a debt exchange and subsequent buyback that 
earned the distinction of being the largest ever debt restructuring by 
volume.1  The debt exchange also involved the largest ever aggregate 
creditor losses.2  The restructuring included the near elimination of 
Greece’s sovereign bonds held by private investors, which had a face value 
of more than 100 percent of Greece’s gross domestic product (GDP).3  The 
architects of the deal applauded themselves for achieving high creditor 
participation (97 percent) and significant debt relief for Greece 
(approximately 50 percent of the country’s GDP).4  But the same 
dealmakers heralding the success of the restructuring concede that the deal 
came far too late (more than two years after Greece lost access to capital 
markets and long after Greece’s debt became unsustainable), created large 
risks for the European official creditors involved, left money on the table 
for Greek taxpayers, created a terrible precedent by paying holdout 
creditors in full, and failed to restore Greece to sustainability.5  And that is 
what the brokers of the global financial system consider a success? 
Lack of experience with sovereign debt crises is no excuse for the 
international community’s current dearth of legal and policy tools to 
address the serious problems presented by situations like that in Greece.  
The first recorded sovereign debt default dates back to at least the fourth 
century BCE, when ten Greek municipalities in the Attic Maritime 
Association defaulted on loans from the Delos Temple.6  And sovereign 
debt difficulties have persisted throughout the subsequent centuries.  
Charles V’s empire relied heavily on short-term and consolidated loans 
with private bankers, despite earning substantial revenues from its 
colonies.7  France defaulted on its debt eight times between 1500 and 
1800,8 while Spain defaulted thirteen times between 1500 and 1900.9  The 
Panic of 1837 led to eight U.S. states plus the Florida Territory defaulting 
 
 1. Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebecsh & Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt 
Restructuring:  An Autopsy, 28 ECON. POL’Y 513, 515–16 (2013). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, REVISITING SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY 25 
(2013), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/10/
sovereign%20bankruptcy/ciepr_2013_revisitingsovereignbankruptcyreport.pdf. 
 5. Id. at 24–26; Zettelmeyer et al., supra note 1, at 517. 
 6. FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS 
FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 3 (2006). 
 7. Juan Gelabert, Castile, 1504–1808, in THE RISE OF THE FISCAL STATE IN EUROPE, C. 
1200–1815, at 206–07 (Richard Bonney ed., 1999). 
 8. Richard Bonney, France, 1494–1815, in THE RISE OF THE FISCAL STATE IN EUROPE, 
C. 1200–1815, supra note 7, at 147–48, 162 (discussing France’s policy of persistent partial 
defaults in order to maintain a serviceable level of debt during the eighteenth century). 
 9. Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff & Miguel A. Savastano, Debt Intolerance, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY, 2003 No. 1, at 1–2, 6. 
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on bonds by the time the subsequent recession ran its course.10  And the 
more than 600 individual cases of sovereign debt restructurings recorded 
since World War II reveal that debt defaults and restructurings have been 
prevalent both across and within countries in the modern era.11 
That sovereigns will continue to utilize capital markets to finance their 
expenditures is a given.12  That at some point any given sovereign will 
experience a mismatch in maturities of outstanding debt obligations and 
adequate currency with which to service it—whether due to domestic policy 
mismanagement, exogenous shocks, or some combination of the two—
seems equally certain.13  Centuries of well-documented financial crises 
would seem to clearly support these statements.14  The recent sovereign 
debt crises in the Eurozone starkly illustrate that the heretofore widely held 
assumption that advanced economies are immune to sovereign debt crises 
in the modern era is plainly wrong.15  Yet under the current international 
 
 10. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 502, 508 (2007). 
 11. Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Debt 
Restructurings 1950–2010:  Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 30 (Int’l Monetary 
Fund, Working Paper No. WP/12/203, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12203.pdf. 
 12. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Responsible Sovereign Lending and 
Borrowing, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 64 (2010) (explaining that advanced economies 
rely on borrowing to finance their budget deficits, while developing countries require it to 
develop); Manuel Monteagudo, Peru’s Experience in Sovereign Debt Management and 
Litigation:  Some Lessons for the Legal Approach to Sovereign Indebtedness, 73 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 201, 212 (2010) (“History shows that public powers have always 
demanded financial resources . . . .”).  At the end of 2011, the external debt stock of the G-7 
countries totaled $42.5 trillion, with an average of 26 percent owed by governments. THE 
WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL DEBT STATISTICS 13 (2013).  The stock of developing 
countries’ external debt has continued on an upward trend, rising from $4.4 trillion in 2010 
to $4.9 trillion at the end of 2011, with 51 percent of long-term debt publicly guaranteed. Id.  
The general government debt of the seventeen Eurozone countries averaged 76 percent of 
GDP in 2011, which is more than twice the comparable ratio for the largest borrowers 
among developing countries. Id.  The seventeen Eurozone countries are:  Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Spain. 
 13. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 39–47; Das et al., supra 
note 11, at 66–82. 
 14. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 3–29 (providing a 
detailed discussion of sovereign debt crises since the nineteenth century); Das et al., supra 
note 11, at 30 (noting that more than 600 sovereign debt restructurings have taken place 
during the last sixty years); see also supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text. See generally 
WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET:  A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 118–52 
(Hartley Withers ed., 14th ed. 1915) (1873) (for a classic treatment of financial panics in a 
broader sense). 
 15. Compare LEX REIFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT:  THE CASE FOR AD HOC 
MACHINERY 50–51 (2003) (asserting the then widely accepted view that “[n]one of the 
mature democracies in the world have come close to a sovereign default in the Bretton 
Woods era” and “a default by one of these countries on its foreign debt is almost 
inconceivable”), with Euro in Crisis, FIN. TIMES, http://www.ft.com/indepth/euro-in-crisis 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (providing news, commentary, and analysis of the Eurozone’s 
ongoing sovereign debt crises unfolding in Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal, and Spain), 
and Charles Forelle, Iceland Borrows $2 Billion From IMF, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2008, 
12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122486370333666973. 
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legal regime, in spite of centuries of experience with the problem and the 
ongoing evolution of international legal institutions, sovereign debt 
restructurings are handled in a totally ad hoc manner.16  They are chaotic, 
messy, unpredictable, and can drag on for many years.17  The current 
regime is marked by serious shortcomings—it lacks transparency and 
legitimacy, is inefficient, and applies inequitable treatment both to debtors 
and creditors.18 
From the vantage point of common law, debt (as the term is used herein) 
is a contract.19  It is a legally enforceable promise between debtor and 
creditor.20  Debt contracts derive their value from the “framework of laws 
and institutions that support them.”21  Certainty, predictability, and 
uniformity of result are important values in all areas of the law.  But where 
the parties are likely to give advance thought to the legal consequences of 
their transactions, as in a contract, these values are at their apex.22 
Proposals for an international legal framework that provides for creditor 
remedies vis-à-vis sovereign debtors in an orderly fashion are nothing 
new.23  Shortly before World War II, the League of Nations formed a 
special committee that proposed the creation of the International Tribunal 
for Debts, which would have had jurisdiction to adjudicate sovereign 
lending contracts with international private borrowers.24  Periods of intense 
intellectual debate in this area have ebbed and flowed since then, 
particularly since the 1970s.25  The academic and policy community now 
finds itself in another period of intense debate.26 
 
 16. See infra Part II.A. 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
 18. See infra Part II.A. 
 19. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 55–63; Ugo Panizza, 
Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt 
and Default, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 651, 651 (2009). 
 20. See, e.g., 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1 (3d ed. 2004); 
see also infra Part I.C. But see, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 55–63 
(discussing limitations on the legal enforcement of sovereign debt contracts, most of which 
are largely practical and political rather than legal). 
 21. REIFFEL, supra note 15, at 11. 
 22. See, e.g., Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1314 (N.Y. 1989) 
(noting that contract law is “an area of the law where certainty, predictability and reliability 
are highly prized common-law goals”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 
cmt. i (1971). 
 23. In 1776, Adam Smith wrote: 
When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same 
manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open, and 
avowed bankruptcy is always the measure which is both least dishonourable to the 
debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor. 
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 883 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library ed. 1937) 
(1776). 
 24. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LOAN CONTRACTS 5–7 (1939); MICHAEL WAIBEL, SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS BEFORE 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 324 (2011). 
 25. See, e.g., Das et al., supra note 11 (providing an in-depth review of the literature 
from 1950 through 2010); see also Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy 
Procedures for Sovereigns:  A History of Ideas, 1976–2001, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 470 
(2002); Kathrin Berensmann & Angélique Herzberg, International Sovereign Insolvency 
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Commentators who favor the idea of a bankruptcy regime for sovereign 
debtors have invoked countless reasons—many grounded in economic, 
policy, social, and moral arguments—to support their position.27  
Opponents have responded with a similarly far-reaching panoply of 
criticisms.28  As the discussion of the utility of a sovereign bankruptcy 
mechanism has reemerged in earnest in the wake of the Eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis29 and the NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina saga,30 this 
Note deigns to enter the fray by elevating one central proposition:  from the 
perspective of contract law, a preagreed framework for the orderly 
resolution of sovereign debt crises, akin to a bankruptcy mechanism, is 
desirable for both debtors and creditors.  Such a mechanism has the 
potential to provide certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result in a 
way that no other existing or proposed solution can.  Just as domestic 
bankruptcy law complements the law of creditor remedies due to the 
shortcomings of the latter,31 so too should a system of international 
bankruptcy law complement the law of creditor remedies in the realm of 
sovereign debt.  As Anna Gelpern aptly stated in a recent commentary, in 
spite of the formidable practical obstacles to implementing a sovereign 
bankruptcy regime, the role of the legal academy “is to challenge 
imaginations until reality catches up.”32  This Note is informed by that 
valuable insight. 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of key features of sovereign 
debt, sovereign debt crises, and subsequent debt workouts, including key 
legal issues.  Part II introduces and discusses the tools that are on the table, 
whether in reality or as academic constructs, for dealing with sovereign debt 
crises.  These tools include ad hoc deals (currently the predominate 
approach), contractual devices, national legislation, and multilateral 
solutions.  Part III takes the position that coordinating sovereign debt 
restructurings through an orderly preagreed framework, in the form of a 
multilateral treaty, would be the most satisfactory solution.  Part III also 
suggests the general contours of the form such a treaty mechanism should 
take, and it concedes some of the key impediments to this approach, 
namely, political realities. 
I.  SOVEREIGN DEBT IN DISTRESS:   
RESTRUCTURINGS, BAILOUTS, AND BAIL-INS 
This Note begins by providing context for the debate regarding sovereign 
debt–crisis resolution.  Part I.A sets forth a basic overview of the sovereign 
 
Procedure—A Comparative Look at Selected Proposals? (German Dev. Inst., Discussion 
Paper No. 23/2007);. 
 26. See infra Part II.D.1.e. 
 27. See infra Part II.D.1. 
 28. See infra Part II.D.1. 
 29. See supra notes 1–4, 12 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra Part I.C.4. 
 31. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 4–19 (1986). 
 32. Anna Gelpern, A Skeptic’s Case for Sovereign Bankruptcy, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1095, 
1096 (2013). 
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debt market and explains fundamental concepts and terminology.  Part I.A 
also discusses the key features that distinguish sovereign debt from other 
kinds of debt.  Part I.B identifies the major distortions in the sovereign debt 
market.  Part I.C discusses various legal issues impacting sovereign debt 
workouts, including legal doctrines that limit and enable the enforcement of 
creditor remedies.  Finally, Part I.D explains the collective action problems 
involved in sovereign debt restructurings, including holdout creditors and 
so-called vulture funds.  The problems discussed in this Part invite an 
international policy response. 
A.  Sovereign Debt:  An Overview 
This section introduces the fundamental concepts and distinguishing 
features of sovereign debt in order to lay the necessary foundation for a 
fuller discussion of challenges in sovereign debt markets and, ultimately, 
legal solutions aimed at addressing these challenges. 
1.  Fundamental Concepts 
“Sovereign debt,” as the term is used in this Note, refers to a debt 
instrument issued by a governmental entity.33  A “debt instrument” is a 
financial claim that requires one or more payments of interest or principal 
by the debtor to the creditor at a date, or dates, in the future.34  The term 
“sovereign debt restructuring” denotes any change in the profile of 
contractual payments owed by a sovereign debtor.35  A restructuring may 
simply constitute a rescheduling that involves the deferment of principal 
payments due on maturing debt, without any reduction in the contractual 
interest rate.36  Alternatively, a restructuring could involve both a deferment 
of principal payments and a reduction in the contractual interest rate.37  A 
restructuring may also involve a reduction in the face value of a country’s 
debt, which is known as a “haircut.”38  A “refinancing” denotes the 
conversion of the original debt, including arrears, into a new instrument.39  
The term “workout” is synonymous with “restructuring” in this context.40  
More formal synonyms for “restructuring” and “workout” include 
 
 33. See, e.g., RIEFFEL, supra note 15, at 9–23 (providing a useful and concise discussion 
of the fundamental economic concepts underlying debt contracts); Panizza et al., supra note 
19, at 659–88 (presenting a survey of the economic literature on sovereign debt). 
 34. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT STATISTICS:  GUIDE FOR 
COMPILERS AND USERS 3 (2013), available at http://www.tffs.org/pdf/method/2013/
psds2013.pdf.  The following is a nonexhaustive list of debt instruments:  special drawing 
rights; currency and deposits; debt securities; loans; insurance; pensions; standardized 
guarantee schemes; and other accounts payable. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS?  RESPONDING 
TO FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS 3 n.3 (2004). 
 36. See, e.g., id. 
 37. See, e.g., id.; Das et al., supra note 11, at 82–87 (discussing the economics of 
sovereign debt restructurings). 
 38. See, e.g., ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 3. 
 39. See, e.g., RIEFFEL, supra note 15, at 23. 
 40. Id. at 20. 
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“bankruptcy” and “insolvency.”41  All of these terms denote the procedures, 
both formal and informal, for resolving the settlement of creditors’ 
contractual claims when a borrower is unable to meet its obligations in 
full.42 
The following is a brief summary of the fundamental dynamic underlying 
a restructuring.  If creditors agree to take a haircut, reducing the excessive 
debt burden of a sovereign debtor, the country may be enabled to strengthen 
its economy, thereby increasing its ability to repay the remaining debt.43  
Instead of absorbing a sizeable loss from a sovereign default, creditors may 
benefit by restructuring debt in this manner and subsequently bearing a 
smaller loss.44  But if creditors renegotiate debt too easily, future debtors 
will be incentivized to default even when they can feasibly repay.45 
“Bailouts” involve official sector lending in response to a sovereign debt 
crisis,46 while “bail-ins” denote commitments from private sector creditors 
engaging in various forms of so-called “burden sharing.”47  What is termed 
the “official” or “public” sector includes the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank, regional and multilateral development banks, the 
group of bilateral creditors that comprise the Paris Club, and governmental 
entities (such as central banks, departments, agencies, and other 
government-controlled institutions).48  The finance ministers from the 
Group of Seven (G-7) countries—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States—assume the primary role in 
designing the policy framework for sovereign debt workouts, and the IMF 
is their principal instrument for implementation.49  Other multilateral 
institutions undertake a secondary role.50  The prominent role of the G-7 is 
directly related to the economic dominance of these countries in the global 
economy and the political clout of their heads of state.51  When a crisis 
leads to an imminent or actual sovereign default, the G-7 architects 
determine the amounts and forms of official support that will be deployed 
to mitigate the crisis and to finance the country’s recovery.52 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of Contractual Terms 
in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 134 (2012). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See, e.g., Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, International Bailouts, Moral 
Hazard and Conditionality, 16 ECON. POL’Y 409 (2001); see also infra notes 53–57 and 
accompanying text. 
 47. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 8–9 (discussing 
how, in principle, creditor moral hazard can be mitigated by employing official rescue 
packages that “bail-in” private creditors); ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 6, 18 
(discussing different types of bailouts and bail-ins). 
 48. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 1 n.1; see also RIEFFEL, supra note 15, at 24–
44, 56–94 (providing a useful sketch of the main players involved in sovereign workouts, 
including the official sector, and a discussion of the Paris Club process). 
 49. REIFFEL, supra note 15, at 24. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 24–25. 
 52. Id. at 26–27. 
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Bailouts are controversial.53  The United States and other G-7 architects 
often choose to provide bailouts for countries where they have strategic and 
financial interests at stake.54  Absent an established international framework 
for dealing with distressed sovereign debtors in an orderly fashion, the 
decision by the official sector as to whether or not to provide rescue 
financing to a sovereign in crisis is consequential.  The economic and 
financial losses resulting from an unabated crisis will often wreak havoc on 
a crisis country (including bank panics, capital flight, and the loss of access 
to credit markets for households and private businesses),55 and these 
economic losses often spill over beyond the borders of the crisis country.56  
Furthermore, policy choices for dealing with a sovereign debt crisis will 
influence expectations about how other countries will act and how the 
international community will respond when they find themselves in 
trouble.57 
 
 53. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 8 (explaining 
the idea that overborrowing on the part of sovereigns might be the result of moral hazard 
linked to bailouts since creditors may have incentives to lend recklessly because official 
bailout packages may enable repayments that are above the socially optimal level, with the 
resulting bill footed by local taxpayers who end up repaying even when it would have been 
better to restructure); Michael D. Bordo & Anna J. Schwartz, Under What Circumstances, 
Past and Present, Have International Rescues of Countries in Financial Distress Been 
Successful?, 18 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 683, 705–06 (1999) (concluding that since 1973, 
bailouts have involved relatively large transfers of wealth “from the less wealthy to the 
wealthier” and that bailouts during the 1990s have increased moral hazard, which “weakens 
incentives for lenders to monitor the performance of both the private and public sectors 
where they invest”); Jeanne & Zettelmeyer, supra note 46; Devesh Kapur, The IMF:  A Cure 
or a Curse?, FOREIGN POL’Y, Summer 1998, at 114, 125 (1998) (discussing moral hazard 
experienced by the IMF due to the fact that the Fund is almost always repaid). But see 
RIEFFEL, supra note 15, at 53–55 (discussing the term “bailout” in this context and why that 
term may be misleading).  Broadly speaking, “moral hazard” refers to situations where 
actors do not fully internalize the consequences of their actions. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, 
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 961 
(1963); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance:  The Pure Theory of Moral 
Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 4, 5 (1983). 
 54. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 5; Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Roadblock to a 
Sovereign Bankruptcy Law, 23 CATO J. 73, 74 (2003) [hereinafter Sachs, Roadblock]  
(“Managing sovereign insolvency is all politics—whose favored pupil or geopolitical ward 
you are, or perhaps whose enemy you are.”); Jeffrey D. Sachs, Do We Need an International 
Lender of Last Resort 2 (Apr. 20, 1995), available at http://www.earth.columbia.edu/
sitefiles/file/about/director/pubs/intllr.pdf [hereinafter Sachs, International Lender of Last 
Resort] (“[A] country’s ability to secure debt relief depends much more on its pecking order 
in international politics then [sic] it does on financial merit.”). 
 55. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 52–58; Panizza et al., 
supra note 19, at 674–82; Das et al., supra note 11, at 60–65. 
 56. See, e.g., ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 5; Choi et al., supra note 43, at 137 
(explaining that third-party countries may by harmed by the default of a neighboring 
sovereign because (1) banks and citizens in the third-party countries may own the debt and 
(2) the default of one country can lead to a domino effect resulting in a regional or global 
economic downturn). 
 57. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 5. 
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2.  Distinguishing Features of Sovereign Debt 
Sovereign debt involves peculiarities that distinguish it from corporate 
debt in at least three important ways.  First, because a sovereign cannot be 
liquidated and no formal bankruptcy for sovereigns exists, a country facing 
a debt crisis can never get a fresh start in the way that an individual or 
corporation can by undergoing an insolvency proceeding.58  Second, due to 
practical and legal constraints, contract enforcement is more difficult to 
achieve where the debtor is a sovereign.59  The practical reason for this is 
that compelling a government to pay against its will can be difficult since 
most of its assets or income (including tax revenue) that could be used for 
repayment are located inside the sovereign’s territory.60  The primary legal 
constraint on recovery is the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which limits 
the ability of sovereigns to be sued in foreign courts absent the sovereign’s 
consent.61  Sovereign immunity and other key legal characteristics of 
sovereign debt are discussed more fully in Part I.C.  Finally, discerning 
when a sovereign is actually insolvent can be difficult.62 
Notably, creditor panics are more likely to occur in the context of 
international or external sovereign borrowing—as opposed to domestic 
sovereign borrowing, where a treasury issues debt denominated in domestic 
currency in a transaction that is governed by local law.63  International 
sovereign borrowing involves a government borrowing foreign currency in 
 
 58. See, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 32, at 1098; Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 100 (2007) (discussing the impossibility of a fresh start despite 
successive debt relief initiatives for poor countries).  As Thomas Jackson explained in the 
context of individual bankruptcy: 
The principal advantage bankruptcy offers an individual lies in the benefits 
associated with discharge.  Unless he has violated some norm of behavior 
specified in the bankruptcy laws, an individual who resorts to bankruptcy can 
obtain a discharge from most of his existing debts in exchange for surrendering 
either his existing nonexempt assets or . . . a portion of his future earnings. 
Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 
1393 (1986) (citations omitted). 
 59. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 55–56; Panizza et al., 
supra note 19, at 652–659; see also infra Part I.C. 
 60. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 55–56; Panizza et al., 
supra note 19, at 653. 
 61. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 56; Panizza et al., supra 
note 19, at 653–54; see also infra Part I.C.1. 
 62. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 6 (“[D]ebt 
crises cannot be neatly separated into excusable defaults driven by fundamentals and 
inexcusable repudiations.”); Choi et al., supra note 43, at 132–33 (explaining that it can be 
difficult for outside investors to tell when a country is able to repay its debts (by, for 
example, raising taxes, liquidating assets, or diverting revenues from other projects), and 
when a country is truly not able to repay its debts (due to shocks, including economic 
downturn, natural disaster, civil war, or lack of political will to engage in painful policies 
necessary to make debt service feasible)); Das et al., supra note 11, at 71 (noting that any 
debt sustainability analysis involves judgment and making projections of key variables that 
are inherently difficult to predict). 
 63. Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at 5; cf. Das et al., supra 
note 11, at 52–53 (discussing the key differences between domestic and external debt 
restructurings). 
2014] SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY 2483 
international capital markets.64  Such a transaction involves foreign 
currency risk for the sovereign debtor,65 while protecting creditors against, 
for example, the risk of opportunistic pursuit of inflationary policies on the 
part of the sovereign debtor.66  It also means that the domestic central bank 
will be unable to act as a lender of last resort, since the central bank is only 
able to control the money supply of domestic currency.67  Any financing the 
sovereign debtor is able to obtain to service international bonds may need to 
be accompanied by conditionalities on the behavior of the government, and 
such conditionality may be difficult to negotiate in a timely manner.68  
Thus, a solvent but illiquid sovereign borrower may find it difficult to 
obtain necessary financing in international capital markets to service 
outstanding debt, and may be pushed into an unnecessary default as a 
result.69 
3.  (Un)Sustainability of Sovereign Debt 
Whether a sovereign’s debt profile is sustainable is not simply a matter of 
the size of a country’s debt in relation to the size of its economy.70  Other 
key variables include the average interest rate payable on the debt, the 
maturity dates, and the proportion denominated in foreign currency.71  
Many of these factors tend to be correlated with the overall debt level.72  
Countries with large debts relative to the size of their economies usually 
can borrow only at high rates for short periods, and they usually must 
promise investors protection from exchange rate movements in order to 
attract funds (i.e., debt contracts will not be denominated in local 
currency).73  The political support to pay also tends to decrease as the 
amount of effort required to pay increases.74 
The restructuring process begins when the debtor has insufficient foreign 
exchange reserves to cover scheduled external debt service payments and 
payments for essential imports.75  The legal effect of directing public and 
private sector borrowers within a country to suspend payments of principal 
 
 64. Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at 5. 
 65. See, e.g., Das et al., supra note 11, at 52–53 (noting that exchange rate 
considerations and currency mismatches play a lesser role in domestic debt). 
 66. Choi et al., supra note 43, at 149 (“If a country borrows in its own currency, and 
then devalues that currency, then the burden of repayment and the value of the debt are 
reduced.”). 
 67. Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at 5. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 20 n.24. 
 71. Id.  Emerging market countries tend to issue long-term debt in foreign currency and 
short-term debt in both domestic and foreign currency, while advanced countries mostly 
issue long-term debt in domestic currency. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 
36.  The debt structures of emerging market countries contribute to debt crises. Id. 
 72. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 20 n.24. 
 73. Id.; see also supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 74. ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 20 n.24. 
 75. Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reisner, The Effect of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Process on Inter-creditor Relationships, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 493, 515. 
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or interest on their external borrowings (i.e., an announced general 
moratorium on debt service) is to compel those borrowers to default76 under 
their separate credit instruments.77  The key legal consequence of a debt 
default is that it empowers individual creditors to pursue remedies against 
the borrower(s).78 
B.  Distortions and Failures in Sovereign Debt Markets 
This section identifies and discusses important distortions and failures in 
sovereign debt markets that provide some of the primary justifications for a 
policy response.  Part I.B.1 discusses key explanations for countries’ 
propensity to overborrow.  Part I.B.2 discusses problems associated with 
sovereigns restructuring too late, and Part I.B.3 discusses problems 
resulting from restructuring too little. 
1.  The Overborrowing Problem 
Traditional theories of sovereign debt hold that the costs associated with 
a default limit the ability of a sovereign to borrow.79  These models tend to 
illustrate “underborrowing,” that is, borrowing at a level that is 
“suboptimally low from a social perspective.”80  But this view seems to be 
inconsistent with actual sovereign borrowing observed across countries and 
over time.81  Advanced economies tend to have higher debt levels than 
emerging market countries, but variations of borrowing levels among 
countries grouped by economic development are so significant that it is 
highly unlikely that most of the these countries’ debt levels are at or 
approaching their upper limit.82  Similarly, dramatic swings in the 
borrowing level of some countries observed during short periods of time are 
not likely to result from changes in borrowing constraints.83  It is more 
likely that countries borrow below their debt limit most of the time and that 
changes in debt levels are attributable to policy choices and economic 
shocks.84  If most countries’ debt levels are attributable to policy choices 
over time, it is possible (and perhaps likely) that many countries are 
overborrowing.85 
Overborrowing may be the result of three key distortions.  First, political 
leaders frequently have incentives to borrow above socially optimal 
 
 76. A simple definition of default is “any failure to meet the contractually stated 
servicing obligations on time and in full.” Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, 
Sovereign Debt As a Contingent Claim:  Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation, 78 
AM. ECON. REV. 1088 n.1 (1988). 
 77. Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 75, at 515. 
 78. Id. at 503. 
 79. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 7; 
STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 48. 
 80. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 7. 
 81. Id.; see also Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 668–70. 
 82. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 7–8. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.; see also Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 666–67. 
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levels.86  Second, overborrowing may be linked to moral hazard resulting 
from bailout packages and other forms of official sector support.87  The 
presence of bailout packages may induce creditors to lend at reckless levels 
since official bailout packages enable repayment that is beyond a socially 
optimal level.88  The taxpayers of the debtor country pay the price for this 
overpayment because debtor countries tend to repay what they borrow from 
official lenders.89  Third, overborrowing may result from the absence of 
seniority rules for sovereign debtors because new lending dilutes the claims 
of existing creditors.90  Debt dilution can enable excessive debt accrual 
because the marginal interest rate does not reflect the increased risk 
presented by the issuance of new debt.91 
It may very well be that “[d]istorted incentives . . . drive a wedge 
between the maximum that a sovereign can borrow—the borrowing limit—
and what it should be borrowing—the socially optimal amount of 
borrowing.”92  If this is indeed the case, there may not be a social cost 
associated with reducing the costs of crises.93  To the extent making debt 
restructurings easier leads to increased borrowing costs, the higher cost of 
capital would actually improve overall welfare for countries that 
“overborrow” above the socially optimal amount.94  Furthermore, while 
overborrowing is clearly problematic once sovereign debt levels become 
unsustainable, empirical studies indicate that public sector borrowing may 
have a “crowding out” effect on private sector borrowing and other 
productive investments.95 
 
 86. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 8; see also BARRY 
EICHENGREEN ET AL., INT’L CTR. FOR MONETARY AND BANKING STUD., PUBLIC DEBTS:  NUTS, 
BOLTS AND WORRIES 15–17 (2011). 
 87. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 22; see also Hal 
S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 INT’L LAW. 103 (2003) 
(summarizing key arguments regarding bailouts and moral hazard and resulting market 
discipline problems); Jeanne & Zettelmeyer, supra note 46, at 411–12 (emphasizing the 
problem of bailouts creating moral hazard that facilitates bad domestic policies at the 
expense of domestic taxpayers); supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text. 
 88. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 8; Jeanne & Zettelmeyer, 
supra note 46, at 411–12. 
 89. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 8; Jeanne & Zettelmeyer, 
supra note 46, at 410–11. 
 90. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 9; Patrick Bolton & 
Olivier Jeanne, Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt:  The Role of a Bankruptcy 
Regime, 115 J. POL. ECON. 901, 913–18 (2007). 
 91. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 9; Bolton & Jeanne, 
supra note 90, at 412. 
 92. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 6. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 6; Reinhart et al., supra note 9, at 5.  This argument directly counters 
objections to a formalized sovereign bankruptcy mechanism based on the idea that such a 
policy response would subsequently increase capital costs. See infra notes 332–36, 395 and 
accompanying text. 
 95. See, e.g., Fernando Broner et al., Sovereign Debt Markets in Turbulent Times:  
Creditor Discrimination and Crowding-Out Effects 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 19676, 2013) (showing that the increased probability of default raises 
spreads on sovereign debt, thereby providing incentives for domestic creditors to purchase 
sovereign debt and creating inefficient “crowding-out regions”); Şenay Ağca & Oya 
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Furthermore, an overindebted sovereign may be unable to attract 
voluntary new lending for productive investment since any new borrowing 
will have to be used to pay off existing debt.96  According to Paul 
Krugman, if a country is unable to meet its debt service obligations, 
creditors have two choices:  (1) they can finance the country, lending at an 
expected loss with the hope that the sovereign will eventually be able to 
repay its debt; or (2) they can forgive existing obligations, reducing the 
sovereign’s debt level to one that the country can repay.97  Under the first 
option, if the sovereign turns out to do relatively well, creditors will not 
have written down their claim unnecessarily.98  But the burden of debt 
distorts the sovereign’s incentives, since the creditors, rather than the 
sovereign itself, mainly realize the benefits of good economic 
performance.99 
2.  The Restructuring-Too-Late Problem 
Some commentators emphasize the risk that a sovereign debtor may 
default on a debt obligation simply because it is unwilling to make the 
required payments, and not because it cannot make such payments.100  
Others, however, emphasize the deterrent effect resulting from the fact that 
a default typically leads to a major loss of confidence in all of the country’s 
other financial assets, including the sovereign’s local debt and currency, 
which in turn is likely to trigger a severe loss in output following a 
default.101  Furthermore, legal and reputational costs have deterrent effects 
 
Celasun, How Does Public External Debt Affect Corporate Borrowing Costs in Emerging 
Markets? (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/09/266, 2009) (finding that an 
increase in the external debt of emerging market governments significantly raises the 
borrowing costs of the domestic corporate sector); M. Shahe Emran & Subika Farazi, Lazy 
Banks?  Government Borrowing and Private Credit in Developing Countries 15 (Inst. for 
Int’l Econ. Policy, Working Paper No. IIEP-WP-2009-9, 2009) (utilizing panel data from 
sixty developing countries to estimate that a $1 increase in government borrowing reduces 
private credit by about $1.40). 
 96. Paul Krugman, Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang, 29 J. DEV. ECON. 253, 
254 (1988); see also Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards:  The Problem of Quasi-
sovereign Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 888, 926–30 (2012). 
 97. Krugman, supra note 96, at 254, 267. 
 98. Id. at 254. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 96–97; Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. 
Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?:  The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 
53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1048–51 (2004) (explaining why political factors unique to sovereign 
debtors may contribute to an opportunistic default); Hal S. Scott, Sovereign Debt Default:  
Cry for the United States, Not Argentina 1 (Wash. Legal Found., Working Paper Series No. 
140, 2006) (arguing that “[t]he root of the sovereign debt problem is that sovereigns 
overborrow . . . in excess of their institutional capacity to efficiently employ the borrowed 
capital” and that such “[o]verborrowing results from the fact that sovereigns face few 
consequences as a result of default”). 
 101. See, e.g., ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 27; STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, 
supra note 6, at 49–52 (providing a useful discussion of the empirical evidence of default 
costs); Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, The Costs of Sovereign Default, 56 IMF STAFF 
PAPERS 683, 690–97 (2009); Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 667–71, 674–88 (surveying the 
economic literature on sovereign debt defaults and subsequent costs). 
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on the possibility of sovereign default.102  And policymakers may delay 
default due to self-interest and short political horizons.103 
In fact, the weight of the evidence seems to indicate that policymakers’ 
reluctance to restructure their debts leads to suboptimal postponement of 
inevitable defaults.104  In turn, delayed defaults are costly to the 
international financial system.105  Delayed defaults lead to the loss of value 
since a prolonged period prior to an anticipated default or crisis may lessen 
a country’s capacity and willingness to pay.106  Capacity to pay is reduced 
because the delay prolongs uncertainty, high interest rates, and restrictive 
fiscal policies that deepen output contractions.107  Willingness to pay is 
reduced because after suffering through lengthy periods of economic 
austerity, constituents are less likely to support a debt restructuring on 
creditor-friendly terms.108  When the restructuring does finally take place, 
residual creditors will recover less of their investment than they might have 
otherwise, because a smaller group of creditors will have to absorb the 
burden.109 
3.  The Restructuring-Too-Little Problem 
When debt restructurings do occur, all too often they fail to restore the 
sovereign to debt sustainability and market access, which in turn leads to 
unnecessary costs and repeated restructurings.110  The current system of ad 
hoc sovereign debt restructurings may produce two bad equilibria.111  In the 
first, restructurings are creditor-friendly and have the advantage of being 
negotiated quickly, but the disadvantage of failing to solve the debt 
sustainability problem.112  In the second equilibrium, sovereigns can 
achieve greater debt relief, but the trade-off is lengthy negotiations and 
 
 102. See, e.g., Borensztein & Panizza, supra note 101, at 697–707. 
 103. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 10; Borensztein 
& Panizza, supra note 101, at 716–22. 
 104. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 10; INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING—RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 15–27 (2013); Borensztein 
& Panizza, supra note 101, at 716–22; Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Ugo Panizza, The Elusive 
Costs of Sovereign Defaults, 94 J. DEV. ECON. 95, 103–04 (2011). 
 105. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 104, at 20. 
 106. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 10; INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, supra note 104, at 20. 
 107. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 10; INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, supra note 104, at 20. 
 108. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 10. 
 109. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 104, at 20. 
 110. Id. at 24–25 (acknowledging this phenomenon and the IMF’s own role in 
contributing to it through overly optimistic assessments and forecasts of debt sustainability); 
see also infra note 217. 
 111. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 11; Andrew Powell, 
Bipolar Debt Restructuring:  Lessons from LAC, VOX LACEA (Feb. 24, 2011), 
http://vox.lacea.org/?q=node/61. 
 112. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 11; Powell, supra note 
111. 
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prolonged litigation.113  “Myopic policymakers” may exacerbate these 
problems if they prioritize regaining access to capital markets quickly and 
thus push for implementation of swift, creditor-friendly restructurings, 
leaving others to deal with the costs of future defaults.114 
C.  Limitations on Enforcement of Creditor Remedies  
and Other Legal Issues 
As mentioned above in Part I.A.2, the ability of creditors to enforce 
claims against sovereign debtors is more limited than in the corporate debt 
context.115  Much of the academic literature on sovereign debt emphasizes 
this fact and assumes that creditors have little or no legal recourse against 
defaulting sovereigns116 and that the sovereign debt market only works at 
all because of various nonlegal mechanisms (including reputational 
concerns and political pressures).117  But several high profile cases 
demonstrate that legal enforcement of sovereign debt obligations is indeed 
possible.118  This section outlines the key legal doctrines limiting 
enforcement of creditor claims against sovereign borrowers, which are 
sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine, and international comity.  
This section concludes by discussing pari passu clause interpretation, 
which, conversely, enables creditors to recover against sovereign 
borrowers. 
1.  Sovereign Immunity 
The principle of absolute sovereign immunity traditionally protected 
sovereigns from suit in foreign courts absent their consent.119  Following 
World War II and against the backdrop of the Cold War, the United States 
began to adopt a more restrictive view of sovereign immunity because it 
disliked the idea of conferring sovereign immunity to Soviet Union state-
owned enterprises conducting business in the United States.120  This 
restrictive view was embraced in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976 (FSIA), which provides that a sovereign is not immune from 
jurisdiction in suits arising from acts that the sovereign performs in 
 
 113. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 11; Powell, supra note 
111. 
 114. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 12. 
 115. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
 116. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign 
Debt Litigation:  Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
47, 48 (2010) (arguing that foreign sovereign immunity rules function “as a rough, 
sometimes inadequate, proxy for insolvency laws”). 
 117. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. 
 118. See infra Part I.C.4; infra notes 185–97 and accompanying text. 
 119. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 56; Panizza et al., supra 
note 19, at 653. 
 120. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 56; Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 
653. 
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connection with commercial activity.121  The United Kingdom adopted a 
similar law in 1978, and many other jurisdictions have done the same.122 
In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,123 the U.S. Supreme Court 
determined that the issuance of debt in the United States by a sovereign fell 
squarely within the ambit of the FSIA because such a transaction met all of 
the Act’s required elements.124  Thus under U.S. law, international bonds 
issued by a sovereign and any subsequent default are generally considered 
commercial activities under the FSIA, regardless of the purpose of the issue 
or the reason for the default.125  Furthermore, any remaining protections for 
sovereigns under U.S. law can be waived contractually (and routinely are), 
which is also the case in many other jurisdictions.126  Therefore, sovereign 
immunity no longer protects sovereign issuers from being haled into courts 
in the United States and elsewhere by creditors.127 
However, sovereign immunity remains important in attachment 
proceedings.128  Most of a sovereign’s assets located outside of its territory, 
such as military or diplomatic property, do not fall within the commercial 
exception to sovereign immunity.129  Furthermore, under the FSIA and 
 
 121. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006).  The relevant language from the statute provides: 
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the 
United States or of the States in any case— 
  (1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity [and]  
  (2)  in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the 
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United 
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state 
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and 
that act causes a direct effect in the United States. 
 122. Lee C. Buchheit, Sovereign Immunity, 7 BUS. L. REV. 63, 64 (1986); Lee C. 
Buchheit, The Sovereign Client, 48 J. INT’L AFF. 527, 529 (1995). 
 123. 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
 124. Id. at 617–20 (holding that (1) the issuance of bonds was a “commercial activity” 
under the FSIA; (2) the unilateral rescheduling of the bond payments had a “direct effect” in 
the United States, the designated place of performance for Argentina’s contractual 
obligations; and (3) Argentina’s issuance of negotiable debt instruments denominated in U.S. 
dollars and payable in New York, and its appointment of a financial agent in New York, was 
sufficient purposeful availment to satisfy due process minimum contacts requirements). 
 125. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 56–57; Panizza et al., supra note 
19, at 654. 
 126. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 57; Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 
654. 
 127. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 57; Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 
654. 
 128. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1)–(2) (2006).  The Second Circuit has explained: 
[T]he execution immunity afforded sovereign property is broader than the 
jurisdictional immunity afforded the sovereign itself.  For example, while a foreign 
state is not immune from suit for its commercial activities . . . a plaintiff who 
prevails against the sovereign in such actions can generally execute the judgment 
only upon assets with respect to which the foreign state has waived immunity, or 
that the foreign state used for the commercial activity upon which the claim was 
based. 
Walters v. Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(citations omitted); see also STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 57; Panizza et 
al., supra note 19, at 654. 
 129. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 57. 
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similar laws, central bank assets are typically immune from attachment.130  
And a sovereign can attempt to impede access to attachable assets by 
positioning them beyond the reach of foreign courts.131  For example, 
sovereigns have held their assets with the Bank for International 
Settlements in Switzerland, which provides legal protections against 
attachment proceedings.132 
2.  Act of State 
Another potential limitation on creditor recovery from sovereign debtors 
is the act of state doctrine, which prevents U.S. courts from judging the 
validity of a foreign sovereign’s acts performed within its own territory.133  
The act of state doctrine, unlike sovereign immunity, is not jurisdictional.  
Instead, it confers presumptive validity on the acts of foreign sovereigns 
within their territories by rendering nonjusticiable claims that challenge 
such acts.134  Furthermore, the act of state doctrine cannot be waived.135 
However, U.S. courts have declined to find that the act of state doctrine 
protects sovereign debtors from creditor actions for recovery.136  In the 
leading case Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de 
Cartago,137 the Second Circuit held that the act of state doctrine would only 
be applicable to that suit if the situs of the property in question was in Costa 
Rica.138  The court was considering a collection action brought by a creditor 
bank syndicate to recover on promissory notes issued by Costa Rican banks 
 
 130. Id.; Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 654. 
 131. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 57; Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 
654. 
 132. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 57; Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 
654. 
 133. The classic American statement of the act of state doctrine is found in Underhill v. 
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897): 
  Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other 
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts 
of the government of another done within its own territory. 
The modern statement of the act of state doctrine is articulated in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964): 
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within 
its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by this 
country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous 
agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that 
the taking violates customary international law. 
See also Phillip J. Power, Note, Sovereign Debt:  The Rise of the Secondary Market and Its 
Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2732–38 (1996). 
 134. Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 
1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 428 cmt. e (1987). 
 135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 443 cmt. c (“Since the act of 
state doctrine is a judicial policy of self-restraint, the application of the doctrine cannot be 
‘waived’ by the foreign state.”); see also Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State 
Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 345 (1986); Power, supra note 133, at 2732. 
 136. Power, supra note 133, at 2734–38. 
 137. 757 F.2d 516. 
 138. Id. at 521. 
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directly controlled by the Central Bank of Costa Rica.139  The notes were 
payable in U.S. dollars in New York City.140  The court concluded that the 
situs of the property was the United States, and thus the act of state doctrine 
was not applicable.141  Because sovereign debt contracts in default often 
provide for repayment in a foreign currency and consent to foreign 
jurisdiction,142 the Second Circuit’s decision in Allied Bank implies that 
essentially any action to collect debts under these types of agreements in a 
U.S. court will not be barred under the act of state doctrine.143 
3.  Comity 
Comity is the recognition a sovereign grants within its territory to the 
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another sovereign.144  Unlike 
sovereign immunity or the act of state doctrine, comity “is not a rule of law, 
but one of practice, convenience, and expediency. . . .  [I]t is a nation’s 
expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard both to 
international duty and convenience and to the rights of persons protected by 
its own laws.”145  In the context of creditor actions against sovereign 
debtors, international comity allows a U.S. court to respect the actions of a 
foreign sovereign to the extent “they are consistent with law and policy of 
the United States.”146  Unlike the act of state doctrine, which applies only to 
foreign acts outside of U.S. territory, comity may apply even to acts of 
foreign governments on U.S. soil.147  Thus sovereign debtors have invoked 
comity as an alternative defense from the act of state doctrine.148  
Reviewing courts must then determine whether the default in question is 
consistent with U.S. policy.149  However, courts have declined to extend 
 
 139. Id. at 518. 
 140. Id. at 518–19. 
 141. Id. at 521–22 (reasoning that (1) the purported taking in question did not come to 
complete fruition in Costa Rica since the Costa Rican banks’ obligation was to pay Allied, 
the designated bank syndicate, in New York and (2) that New York was also the situs under 
interest analysis). 
 142. See supra notes 64–68, 73 and accompanying text. 
 143. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 58; Christopher C. 
Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Declawing the Vulture Funds:  Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense 
in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 253, 266–67 (2003); Power, supra note 
133, at 2737–38. 
 144. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895). 
 145. Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971); see 
also Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 143, at 266–67; Power, supra note 133, at 2738. 
 146. Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 522 (citing United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332–33 
(1937)) (finding that acts of foreign governments having extraterritorial effect—and 
consequently falling outside the scope of the act of state doctrine—should nevertheless be 
extended comity to the extent that “they are consistent with the law and policy of the United 
States”); Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 895 F. Supp. 660, 664 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 109 F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 147. Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 522; Pravin Banker, 895 F. Supp. at 664 & n.4. 
 148. See, e.g., Pravin Banker, 895 F. Supp. at 664 & n.4. 
 149. In Allied Bank, for example, the Second Circuit initially found for the defendant 
Costa Rican banks on comity grounds because it concluded that Costa Rica’s exchange 
controls were fully consistent with the law and policy of the United States. Allied Bank, 757 
F.2d at 519.  On rehearing, the U.S. Department of Justice joined the litigation as amicus 
2492 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
comity to defaulting sovereigns imposing exchange controls or 
experiencing domestic economic crisis.150 
4.  Pari Passu Clause Interpretation 
While sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine, and comity have not 
proven to be particularly effective defenses in actions to recover on 
defaulting sovereign debt, the ratable payment interpretation of the pari 
passu clause151 in the recent Second Circuit decision NML Capital, Ltd. v. 
Republic of Argentina152 further empowers creditors to recover against 
defaulting sovereigns.153  In 2001, Argentina defaulted on more than $80 
billion in external debt, then the largest sovereign debt default in history.154  
Argentina subsequently initiated an exchange offer allowing bondholders to 
exchange their defaulted bonds for new unsecured and unsubordinated 
 
curiae and clarified its position that Costa Rica’s attempted unilateral restructuring of private 
obligations was inconsistent with U.S. policy. Id. 
 150. See, e.g., Lightwater Corp. Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 02 CIV. 3804, 2003 WL 
1878420, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2003) (rejecting the argument that international law 
would bar plaintiffs from suing on bonds at a time when the issuer, the Republic of 
Argentina, was having a severe economic crisis); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. 
People’s Republic of the Congo, 729 F. Supp. 936, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that the 
court was “mindful of the fact that enforcement of this default judgment is likely to cause 
financial difficulties for the Congo,” but the court was “not the appropriate government 
institution to weigh the harm to the Congo of paying a valid judgment, against the harm to 
[plaintiff] that would flow from its being denied its legal right to enforcement of the 
judgment”); A.I. Credit Corp. v. Gov’t of Jam., 666 F. Supp. 629, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(recognizing the court had been advised that its holding could have a “devastating financial 
impact on the Government of Jamaica” but concluding that “it is not the function of a federal 
district court . . . to evaluate the consequences to the debtor of its inability to pay nor the 
foreign policy or other repercussions of Jamaica’s default”); see also Power, supra note 133, 
at 2738–42. 
 151. The Latin phrase pari passu means “by equal step” or “[p]roportionally.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (9th ed. 2009).  Pari passu clauses are a standard term contained in 
most cross-border lending agreements that memorialize a “borrower’s promise to ensure that 
the obligation will always rank equally in right of payment with all of the borrower’s other 
unsubordinated debts.” Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in 
Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869, 870 (2004); see also Blackman & Mukhi, 
supra note 116, at 55–57; Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Understanding the Pari Passu Clause 
in Sovereign Debt Instruments:  A Complex Quest, 43 INT’L LAW. 1217, 1226–27 (2009). 
 152. 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, No. 12-842 (Jan. 10, 2014) (granting 
certiorari on the question of the permissible scope of postjudgment discovery), petition for 
cert. filed, No. 13-990 (Feb. 18, 2014) (petitioning for certiorari again following a denial of 
rehearing by the Second Circuit and posing the questions of (1) whether a court may enter an 
injunction that effectively forces a sovereign to pay money damages with assets that are 
immune from attachment under the FSIA and (2) whether the “Court should certify to the 
New York Court of Appeals [the question of w]hether a foreign sovereign is in breach of a 
pari passu clause when it makes periodic interest payments on performing debt without also 
paying on its defaulted debt”). 
 153. See W. M. C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina, 8 CAP. 
MARKETS L.J. 123, 126–29 (2013); Romain Zamour, Note, NML v. Argentina and the 
Ratable Payment Interpretation of the Pari Passu Clause, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 55, 56 
(2013), http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-38-zamour-nml-v-argentina.pdf. 
 154. CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT:  EIGHT 
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 10, 12 (2009); Argentina’s Debt Default:  Gauchos and 
Gadflies, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2011, at 91. 
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external debt at a rate of twenty-five to twenty-nine cents on the dollar.155  
Approximately three-quarters of the bondholders took part in a debt 
exchange in 2005.156  Another debt exchange under similar terms took 
place in 2010, bringing the participation rate up to 91 percent.157  Hedge 
funds specializing in trading distressed sovereign debt, such as Elliott 
Associates,158 purchased large amounts of Argentine debt at a significant 
discount on the secondary market, refused to join the restructurings, and 
sought full collection of their debt.159 
In February 2012, Judge Thomas Griesa of the Southern District of New 
York issued orders enjoining Argentina from making payments on its 
restructured 2005 and 2010 debt without making ratable payments to NML 
Capital, a hedge fund affiliated with Elliott Associates.160  A unanimous 
panel of the Second Circuit substantially affirmed the district court’s order 
in October 2012.161  The effect of this order was that Argentina was 
prohibited from making full payment on its restructured debt without also 
making full payment to the holdout plaintiffs.  This interpretation of the pari 
passu clause, known as the ratable payment interpretation, means that not 
only must equally ranking debt be paid equally when the debtor promises in 
a pari passu clause to maintain the equal ranking, but also that if there is not 
enough money to pay all equally ranking creditors in full, each holder of 
equally ranking debt must receive a ratable share.162  And these principles 
are enforceable by a court-ordered injunction against both the debtor and 
the recipients of nonratable payments.163 
According to many observers, Judge Griesa’s adoption of the ratable 
payment interpretation of the pari passu clause is highly problematic and 
does not comport with market participants’ expectations.164  When the 
 
 155. NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 252. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 252–53. 
 158. See infra notes 180–84 and accompanying text. 
 159. Argentina’s Debt Default, supra note 154; see also infra Part I.D.2. 
 160. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., No. 08Civ.6978 (TPG), 09Civ.1707 (TPG), 
09Civ.1708 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012). 
 161. NML Capital, 699 F.3d 246. 
 162. Buchheit & Pam, supra note 151, at 877–83. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See, e.g., Weidemaier, supra note 153, at 126–29; G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. 
Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. LAW. 635, 639–50 (2001).  According to Lee Buchheit and 
Jeremiah Pam: 
[E]qually-ranking debts must be paid equally—that’s the theory.  By the debtor[’s] 
openly announcing its agreement (in a registration statement filed with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, for example) to maintain the equal ranking 
of this bond with other debts, have those other creditors been given the power to 
enjoin a payment under this bond, regardless of whether the instruments 
evidencing those other debts contain their own pari passu covenants? 
  And if there is even the remotest possibility of this outcome, why would the 
purchasers of such a bond agree up front to decline to accept payments under their 
instrument unless every other equally-ranking lender to that borrower was also 
being paid in full?  Analyzed in this way, a pari passu covenant is a positively 
dangerous clause to include in any debt instrument. 
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Second Circuit affirmed Judge Griesa’s orders, many commentators 
vociferously criticized the decision and announced the end of sovereign 
debt restructuring.165  Resumption of payment only to restructured 
bondholders is central to any sovereign debt restructuring, and the ratable 
payment interpretation of the pari passu clause makes this selective 
resumption of payment impossible.166  The decision, if left intact by the 
Supreme Court, would effectively end consensual sovereign debt 
restructuring because it would incentivize holding out for full repayment167 
and exasperate collective action problems. 
D.  Collective Action Problems 
Developments and innovation in capital markets during recent decades 
have diversified risk associated with holding sovereign debt while 
exacerbating collective action difficulties.  This section discusses problems 
arising from coordinating diffuse creditors in a sovereign debt restructuring.  
Part I.D.1 discusses the characteristics of creditors holding sovereign debt, 
and Part I.D.2 addresses holdout litigation and vulture funds. 
1.  Dispersion and Heterogeneity of Creditors 
Since the mid-1990s, holders of sovereign debt instruments have 
predominantly been widely dispersed bondholders with diverse institutional 
characteristics—sophisticated hedge funds, pension funds, individual retail 
investors, and everything in between.168  For example, the Argentine bonds 
restructured in 2005169 were held by a particularly fragmented group of 
creditors:  institutional investors held 56.5 percent of restructured bonds, 
and retail investors held 43.5 percent.170  The creditor group was also 
dispersed geographically:  38.4 percent of the bonds were held 
domestically, 15.6 percent in Italy, 10.3 percent in Switzerland, 9.1 percent 
 
Buchheit & Pam, supra note 151, at 886.  Monteagudo argues that this interpretation of the 
pari passu clause 
would make impossible the continuity of financial operations of a debtor breaching 
a contract . . . and would render unnecessary the mere existence of bankruptcy-law 
principles [since a]ccording to those principles, under a debtor’s petition, the State 
prohibits any individual creditor’s recovery outside of an orderly and proportional 
payment to all creditors. 
Monteagudo, supra note 12, at 210. 
 165. See, e.g., Weidemaier, supra note 153, at 131; Zamour, supra note 153. 
 166. See, e.g., Weidemaier, supra note 153, at 131. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See, e.g., REIFFEL, supra note 15, at 190–93; Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 671; 
Das et al., supra note 11, at 21–22.  Prior to the creation of the secondary debt market during 
the late 1980s, the vast majority of holders of distressed debt were banks, which had an 
incentive not to declare a borrower in default because they would then be required to write 
down their loans. See, e.g., Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 655–56.  This situation began to 
change in the late 1980s with the creation of a secondary market in securitized loans, id., and 
with the implementation of the Brady Plan, which involved exchanging bank loans into 
sovereign bonds. See, e.g., Das et al., supra note 11, at 18. 
 169. See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text. 
 170. Das et al., supra note 11, at 24. 
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in the United States, 5.1 percent in Germany, and 3.1 percent in Japan.171  
The 43.5 percent retail investor group was comprised of more than 600,000 
individuals (450,000 Italians, 35,000 Japanese, and 150,000 Germans and 
Central Europeans).172  However, sovereign creditor structures are not 
always as fragmented as Argentina’s.  For example, in 2007, Belize 
restructured debt owed to a concentrated creditor group involving mostly 
institutional investors from the region.173  During the Belize restructuring, a 
creditor committee was formed and was composed of thirteen financial 
institutions from the Caribbean, representing more than 50 percent of 
outstanding debt.174 
Multicreditor debt instruments, such as bonds and syndicated bank loans, 
are legal arrangements that present archetypal common pool problems when 
an issuer runs into financial difficulties.175  Once an issuer’s financial 
problems emerge, the actions of any one bondholder can significantly 
impact the interests of all the other creditors.176  For example, if each holder 
has absolute discretion to accelerate its bonds following an event of default, 
to commence an action for debt collection and attach the borrower’s assets, 
or to force a foreclosure on collateral, then the other bondholders may find 
that their own options are significantly diminished.177  Thus, as observable 
financial strains on the bond issuer appear, grabbing a borrower’s assets 
ahead of fellow bondholders may be a sound business decision because 
usually little will remain for the slowest acting creditor.178  This dynamic is 
especially pronounced in the context of a sovereign debt crisis because no 
formal bankruptcy regime exists to provide for a predictable, orderly, and 
timely restructuring based on a preagreed equitable framework. 
2.  Holdout Creditors and Vulture Funds 
Because participation in a sovereign debt restructuring is voluntary, 
creditors may “hold out” instead of participating in an effort to obtain better 
repayment terms or even the full value of their claims.179  During the late 
1980s and early 1990s, a secondary market for distressed sovereign debt 
developed as banks sold rescheduled sovereign debt at a significantly 
discounted price in order to get it off their balance sheets.180  This 
secondary market attracted investors known as “vulture creditors” or 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective 
Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1320 (2002). 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. 
 178. Id.; see also infra notes 302–04 and accompanying text. 
 179. See, e.g., Fisch & Gentile, supra note 100, at 1045; Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 
656. 
 180. See, e.g., Ronald J. Silverman & Mark W. Deveno, Distressed Sovereign Debt:  A 
Creditor’s Perspective, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 179, 185 (2003); see also Lee C. 
Buchheit, The Capitalization of Sovereign Debt:  An Introduction, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 401, 
402. 
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“vulture funds”181 that specialize in the strategic purchase of sovereign debt 
trading at a deep discount as a result of the sovereign’s financial distress.182  
Vulture creditors may “free ride” by holding out during a restructuring for 
better terms than those already agreed to by other creditors, or they may 
attempt to sell their claims to other creditors eager to complete the 
restructuring.183  If this strategy is unsuccessful, a vulture creditor may seek 
to collect the full face value of its claim from the sovereign through 
“holdout” litigation.184 
One of the most commonly cited examples of successful holdout 
litigation is the suit brought by Elliott Associates, L.P. (Elliott), a vulture 
fund, against Peru.185  Elliott paid approximately $11 million on the 
secondary market for letter agreements with a face value of approximately 
$20 million, issued by Banco de la Nación and Banco Popular del Peru, and 
guaranteed by Peru.186  At the time, Peru was in the process of negotiating a 
restructuring of its debt.187  Elliott refused to participate in the restructuring 
and was ultimately awarded more than $55 million.188  While holdout 
creditors often face difficulties successfully enforcing judgments against 
sovereign debtors,189 in this case, the Brussels Court of Appeal authorized 
its execution through an order to block any payment in favor of Brady-bond 
creditors.190  Peru subsequently settled for $56.3 million rather than 
continuing the legal battle or risk defaulting on its other debt.191 
Besides haling sovereign governments into court and requiring them to 
expend resources on costly litigation, the aggressive collection strategies of 
vulture fund creditors in some instances have at least temporarily impeded 
sovereign debtors’ ability to carry out fundamental governmental functions.  
On October 2, 2012, the Ghanaian Commercial Court granted NML Capital 
an injunction to prevent the ARA Libertad, an Argentine Navy cadet-
training ship, and its crew from leaving the Ghanaian port of Tema until 
Argentina honored U.S. judgments awarding NML Capital approximately 
$1.6 billion.192  Following a two-month standoff, on December 15, 2012, 
 
 181. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, The Vulture Game, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1992, § 6 
(Magazine), at 18 (explaining that the term “vulture” comes from the analogy that these 
investors “get rich by feeding on the carcasses” of insolvent debtors). 
 182. See, e.g., Fisch & Gentile, supra note 100, at 1088. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id.; see also supra Part I.C.4.  For useful discussions of many key holdout litigation 
cases, see STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 62–76, and Panizza et al., supra 
note 19, at 655–59. 
 185. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nación, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 186. Id. at 366–67. 
 187. Id. at 368. 
 188. See Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nación, 194 F.R.D. 116, 119–20 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
 189. See, e.g., Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 659 (“[F]ull repayment has remained the 
exception, and many holdouts have received nothing.”). 
 190. Gulati & Klee, supra note 164, at 635–38. 
 191. Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 657–58. 
 192. Shane Romig, Argentine Navy Ship Remains Impounded in Ghana, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2012, 8:42 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10000872396390443749204578051231734377620; see also supra Part I.C.4. 
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the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ordered Ghana to release 
Argentina’s frigate.193  The incident caused a significant international 
controversy because the Ghanaian ruling, even if temporary, effectively 
allowed a U.S. hedge fund to interfere with the most fundamental of 
sovereign powers—the operation of a military vessel consistent with well-
established international law.194 
Argentina’s 2001 default has resulted in extensive litigation in addition to 
the dispute with NML Capital.  Besides a large number of suits filed in 
Argentine courts, by 2005 almost 140 lawsuits had been filed against 
Argentina in New York, Italy, and Germany.195  Many of the creditor 
plaintiffs in these suits successfully obtained judgments, including a $725 
million judgment in favor of EM Ltd., a fund controlled by the Dart 
family.196  The legal battle for enforcement of these judgments is still 
playing out at the time of this writing.197 
Holdout creditors like Elliott and the Darts have been subject to 
widespread criticism.  They have been charged with delaying the 
restructuring process, thereby imposing unnecessary burdens on the citizens 
of the sovereign debtors, and they have been denounced for seeking 
payments for themselves at the expense of other creditors and at the risk of 
jeopardizing the restructuring.198  The often-cited Peru-Elliott example is 
illustrative of the inequities that can arise from successful holdout litigation 
at the expense of creditors that have consented to restructuring.  The 
perception of unfairness results when a holdout creditor recovers an amount 
exponentially greater than the recovery in voluntary restructuring realized 
by pari passu creditors199 and the price such holdout creditor paid to 
purchase the debt instrument on a secondary market.200 
 
 193. The “ARA Libertad” Case (Argentina v. Ghana), Case. No. 20, Order of Dec. 15, 
2012, ¶ 108, http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20_Order_
15.12.2012.corr.pdf. 
 194. See, e.g., Argentine Navy Chief Replaced Amid Libertad Row, BBC NEWS (Oct. 15, 
2012, 21:01 EST), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19957762. 
 195. Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 658. 
 196. EM Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., No. 03 Civ. 2507 (TPG), 2003 WL 22454934 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2003), aff’d, 382 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 2004).  Dart, through CIBC Bank as 
the debt holder of record, had previously sued the Central Bank of Brazil in a high-profile 
case that resulted in a settlement for $25 million in cash and $52 million in Eligible Interest 
Bonds. CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) Ltd. v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 
1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 656. 
 197. See supra Part I.C.4. 
 198. See, e.g., Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 75, at 504 (noting that most of the 
international banking community “probably regret[s] that potentially ‘maverick’ lenders can 
exert a disproportionate influence on the course of events by threatening to withhold consent 
to a restructuring program”); Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 143, at 259–63 (describing 
criticisms of holdouts as disrupting the restructuring process); Das et al., supra note 11, at 
28–29. 
 199. For example, creditors that participated in the Greek debt exchange suffered a 59 to 
65 percent “haircut,” while the holdouts were repaid in full. Zettelmeyer et al., supra note 1, 
at 516. 
 200. In the Peruvian example discussed above, for instance, Elliott Associates received a 
reported settlement amount of $56.3 million on debt they had purchased in the secondary 
market for approximately $11 million. Panizza et al., supra note 19, at 657–58.  Similarly, in 
2498 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
II.  STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES:   
AD HOC DEALS, EX ANTE CONTRACTUAL TOOLS,  
AND MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS 
From the perspective of debtors and creditors alike, it is uncontroversial 
that predictability, consistency, and transparency are important policy 
objectives for designing a framework to deal with distressed sovereign 
debtors.201  But the manner of achieving such predictability, consistency, 
and transparency has and continues to be vociferously debated.202  Part II of 
this Note discusses several solutions, either already on the table or 
advocated by experts and commentators, for handling sovereign debt crises.  
These tools include ad hoc deals (currently the dominant approach), 
contractual devices, national legislation, and multilateral arrangements, 
including a formal sovereign bankruptcy regime. 
A.  Ad Hoc Deals 
Sovereign debt crises are generally resolved by deals negotiated on an ad 
hoc basis, which may or may not involve bailouts.  A restructuring 
commences with a default on debt payments or an announcement of a debt 
restructuring.203  Negotiations between the defaulting sovereign and its 
creditors subsequently begin.204  The primary aim of the debt renegotiations 
is to agree on the terms of a debt exchange that will provide debt relief to 
the sovereign, bringing the sovereign’s debt burden to a sustainable level.205  
The negotiations may last for months or even years.206  During this time 
period, an evaluation of the debtor’s financial situation is done and the 
 
Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Panama, 975 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), Elliott 
successfully obtained judgments for the full face value of debt it had acquired at a substantial 
discount, and subsequently settled for close to the judgment amount. Panizza et al., supra 
note 19, at 657.  However, some observers have defended the role that vulture funds play in 
the sovereign debt market. See, e.g., Fisch & Gentile, supra note 100, at 1048–51 (defending 
the value of vulture creditors as providing liquidity in the secondary sovereign debt market 
and emphasizing the important and legitimate role of holdout litigation as a check on 
opportunistic default). See generally Broner et al., supra note 95, at 5 (summarizing recent 
literature demonstrating how secondary sovereign debt markets restrict governments and 
enforce debts efficiently). 
 201. See, e.g., ROUBINI & SETSER, supra note 35, at 23. 
 202. See, e.g., id. at 335 (“[T]he hardware of the international financial system is in better 
shape than is commonly assumed [since t]he tools needed to respond to a wide range of 
crises by and large already exist, [and that i]t is the software of the international financial 
system—the policies and practices that determine how the existing toolkit is used—that is in 
most need of an upgrade.”); STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 6, at 267–95 
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debtor country often undertakes a macroeconomic adjustment program.207  
One of the first steps is the verification of total debt claims, including 
evaluating the characteristics of the sovereign’s debt stock and debt-service 
profile.208  The next key step is a comprehensive debt sustainability 
analysis, which demonstrates the financing gap, the necessary structural 
adjustments, and the magnitude of needed debt relief.209  Defaulting 
sovereigns and their advisors then develop various restructuring scenarios 
and prepare a final restructuring proposal.210  Once the restructuring offer is 
presented to creditors, they must decide whether to accept the offer.  A 
successful exchange generally requires a specified minimum threshold of 
creditor participation.211  Creditor coordination problems and holdout risks 
are especially problematic during this period.212  This process is 
subsequently repeated within a few years if the adjustment program is 
flawed in design, execution, or due to exogenous factors.213  Bilateral loans 
are handled separately under the Paris Club process,214 and the Bank 
Advisory Committee, known as the London Club, coordinates debt owed to 
commercial banks.215  Suppliers and trade creditors are also handled 
separately through an ad hoc process.216 
The current ad hoc regime for coordinating and resolving sovereign debt 
crises is unpredictable, messy, inefficient, and it lacks legitimacy.217  Debt 
workouts tend to be lengthy and have uncertain, and sometimes unfair, 
outcomes.218  Because it often takes many years before a distressed 
sovereign achieves any debt relief, countries are sometimes forced into 
open default.219  Delayed restructurings in turn lead to the loss of value, 
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which hurts both creditors and debtors alike.220  Also troubling is that a 
sovereign debtor’s success in securing debt relief depends greatly on 
international politics, rather than primarily on financial merit.221 
The consequences of the inequities and inefficiencies that accompany the 
current ad hoc processes are significant since sovereign debt restructurings 
often involve a large-scale redistribution of wealth within and across 
societies and generations.222  When governments borrow to repay 
nonsovereign debt in connection with an IMF-coordinated restructuring or 
bailout, the citizens of the sovereign repay those debts through higher taxes, 
and suffer from reduced spending on healthcare, education, and 
infrastructure.223  Furthermore, due to lack of savings and little access to 
social safety services, the poor are particularly vulnerable to the downside 
of financial crises brought on by their countries’ excessive borrowing.224 
B.  Contractual Devices 
This section discusses various contractual devices aimed at mitigating the 
deadweight costs associated with sovereign debt defaults and workouts.  
Part II.B.1 begins by discussing the problem of incomplete contracting.  
Part II.B.2 addresses collective action clauses.  Part II.B.3 then discusses 
exit consents, and Part II.B.4 outlines trust structures and majority 
enforcement provisions. 
1.  The Problem of Incomplete Contracting 
In response to sovereign debt defaults, issuers and creditors have 
strengthened the terms in sovereign debt contracts that support creditors’ 
ability to enforce their claims judicially and that better empower sovereigns 
to restructure their debts.225  These seemingly contradictory approaches 
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reflect efforts to solve the incomplete contracting problem,226 which 
requires the balancing of several goals:  “encouraging sovereigns to repay 
in the good state; enabling value-increasing restructurings in bad states; 
preventing debtors from seeking to exploit divisions among creditors in 
order to opportunistically reduce their debt burden; and preventing debtors 
from taking risks in order to externalize the cost of default on creditors.”227 
According to one view, the central reason for costly debt crises is the 
impossibility of writing contracts that provide the appropriate incentives for 
the debtor and that efficiently share exogenous risk.228  The difficulty of 
writing such contracts is largely a result of either an information gap or the 
absence of institutions to enforce such contracts.229  That may be because 
“some contingencies are either not observable or not verifiable [by a] court, 
making it difficult if not impossible to contract directly on such 
contingencies.”230 
Many academics and policymakers have focused on improving contracts 
ex ante.231  They have debated optimal terms and endeavored to persuade 
the market to adopt them.232  But aside from the difficulties in providing for 
a comprehensive contractual solution, introducing new terms creates 
uncertainty costs since it is unclear how parties and courts will interpret 
them.233 
2.  Collective Action Clauses 
Collective action clauses (CACs) have garnered much attention and have 
been widely adopted in sovereign bond contracts since 2003 under both 
U.S. and European law.234  CACs are contract terms aimed at ameliorating 
problems presented by holdout creditors and collective action difficulties by 
enabling creditor majorities to bind a potential holdout minority in a debt 
restructuring vote.235  Rather than having to get unanimous consent for a 
change in terms, CACs enable changes to the terms of a bond issuance to be 
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applied to all bondholders of such issuance, provided a prespecified 
majority agree to the changes.236 
Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati conducted a series of interviews with 
market participants and policy actors regarding CACs and found that CACs 
have been adopted largely as a symbolic measure intended to preempt the 
adoption of an international sovereign bankruptcy mechanism and that their 
technical efficacy was unimportant.237  Indeed, several restructurings of 
bonds containing CACs have taken place without actually using the CACs 
available.238  For example, the Greek bonds governed by U.K. law 
restructured in 2012 contained a CAC, but holdout investors successfully 
purchased blocking minorities in individual bond series that could not be 
offset by pro-restructuring majorities.239 
Putting aside the argument that CACs are merely symbolic, another key 
criticism of CACs is that they do not bind creditors of different bond issues 
or other types of debt, such as syndicated bank loans.240  Argentina, for 
example, had 152 bond issues outstanding at the time of its restructuring in 
2005.  Such a debt profile presents the obvious risk that some bond 
syndicates might approve a restructuring, while others reject it.241  Thus, 
while CACs may prove effective where a sovereign has only a few bond 
issuances, the bond-by-bond restructuring strategy is much less effective 
when a sovereign is dealing with multiple bond issuances in multiple 
jurisdictions subject to multiple legal regimes with differing maturities and 
payout terms.  Furthermore, CACs cannot bind creditors that have already 
received a judgment prior to the decision to restructure by a qualified 
majority of creditors.  Additionally, as was the case with Greece, if the 
outstanding amount of a bond issue is small, a prospective holdout creditor 
can, with a relatively modest investment, own a sufficient percentage of the 
issue making it impossible for the CAC ever to be used to cram down a 
change to payment terms on that creditor.242  Finally, CACs do nothing to 
mitigate the tendency for sovereigns to overborrow and to delay initiating a 
restructuring,243 they do not necessarily decrease the amount of time a 
 
 236. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 175, at 1324–30. 
 237. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 231, at 368; see also Michael Bradley, James D. Cox 
& Mitu Gulati, The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes:  Lessons from the 
Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. L. STUD. 289, 320–21 (2010) (“[T]he market appears to attach 
little positive value to the use of CACs.”). 
 238. Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Foreword:  Of Lawyers, Leaders, and Returning 
Riddles in Sovereign Debt, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., at i, viii (2010).  In fact, according 
to Gelpern and Gulati, CACs have only been used once, in 2007, to restructure New York-
law bonds issued by Belize, which “was not a high-stakes battleground for burden-sharing 
between taxpayers and private creditors, unlike the half-dozen CAC-less restructurings that 
came before.” Id. at ix. 
 239. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 26. 
 240. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 43, at 142. 
 241. See, e.g., Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 231, at 318. 
 242. Id.; see also supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra Part I.B.1–2. 
2014] SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY 2503 
restructuring might take,244 nor make the restructuring process more 
transparent and fair. 
Some CAC proponents have advocated for, and some sovereign bonds 
have adopted, an “aggregation feature” that allows changes at the individual 
bond level to be decided with a lower majority of creditors if enough 
investors across all bond issues vote for a restructuring.245  While such an 
aggregation feature may prove more effective than traditional CACs, a debt 
restructuring still must be voted on bond by bond, and the aggregation 
feature does nothing to help restructure a sovereign’s nonbond debt, and it 
does not deal with broader information-sharing problems.  Furthermore, 
aggregation clauses have not yet been utilized in any sovereign debt 
workouts.246 
3.  Exit Consents 
Another contractual tool—exit consents—involves allowing the majority 
creditors to use the amendment clauses in their existing bonds to change 
certain nonpayment terms contained in those bonds (such as financial 
covenants or waivers of sovereign immunity) in order to encourage 
prospective holdouts to participate in a bond exchange.247  A holdout 
bondholder would retain the original bond with the original payment terms, 
but because that bond would have been amended to remove key protective 
covenants, the value of the bond would be reduced and enforcement would 
be limited.248  This technique is referred to as an “exit” consent because the 
sovereign issuer solicits the consent of its creditors to amend the old bonds 
as those lenders exchange their bonds for the sovereign’s new debt 
instruments.249  To effectively discourage holdouts, exit amendments must 
impair the secondary market value of the old bonds following the exchange, 
reduce the likelihood of eventual repayment, or make it harder for a holdout 
creditor to pursue legal remedies against the issuer.250 
Exit consents have survived legal challenges in the corporate bond 
context.251  The leading case is Katz v. Oak Industries Inc.,252 where a 
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bondholder sought to enjoin an exchange offer that included exit 
amendments that would remove all financial covenants binding the issuer, 
on the grounds that it was “coercive” and violated the issuer’s obligation to 
act in good faith with respect to its bondholders.253  The Delaware Court of 
Chancery, however, rejected this argument, reasoning that a corporation 
does not owe its debtholders fiduciary duties and that the exchange offer 
was not so impermissibly coercive as to constitute a breach of an express 
contractual duty or the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.254 
But in a subsequent case, Federated Strategic Income Fund v. Mechala 
Group Jamaica Ltd.,255 a court found that an exit consent went too far.  In 
that case, the debtor corporation sought the consent of bondholders to move 
the corporation’s assets to another entity (not an obligor of the bonds) and 
to eliminate certain guarantees for the bonds.256  After the debt exchange, 
any remaining bondholders would only have recourse against a borrower 
without assets.257  Judge Harold Baer of the Southern District of New York 
held that the objecting bondholders made a sufficient showing that the offer 
and proposed amendments constituted an impairment of the right to sue for 
payment in violation of the indentures and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 
since the offer did not require the unanimous consent of all affected 
noteholders.258 
More recently, in Assénagon Asset Management S.A. v. Irish Bank 
Resolution Corp.,259 a U.K. court found the use of an exit consent in an 
Irish bank’s restructuring as unduly oppressive and ruled in favor of the 
minority bondholder challenging the exchange.260  Holders of Anglo-Irish 
bank bonds, issued pursuant to a trust deed governed by English law, had 
been invited to exchange their holdings for new bonds at twenty cents on 
the euro.261  At the same time, holders were asked to vote for a resolution 
amending the terms of the existing bonds so as to give the issuer the right to 
redeem nonparticipating bonds at €0.01 per €1,000, effectively destroying 
their value.262  In rejecting the validity of the exit consent, the court 
concluded that the “only function [of the exit consent] is the intimidation of 
a potential minority, based upon the fear of any individual member of the 
class that, by rejecting the exchange and voting against the resolution, he 
(or it) will be left out in the cold.”263 
However, exit consents have been successfully deployed in the context of 
sovereign debt restructurings.  In 2000, the Republic of Ecuador 
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accomplished a successful exchange of its existing Brady bonds and 
Eurobonds with a participation rate of approximately 98 percent.264  The 
transaction resulted in a reduction in the face value of Ecuador’s debt stock 
of 40 percent and involved haircuts ranging from 19 to 47 percent.265  The 
high rate of participation in the exchange was likely due to a number of exit 
amendments to the old bonds, including removal of the covenant to 
maintain the listing of the defaulted instruments on the Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange, the cross-default clause, and the negative pledge clause 
restricting the issuance of collateralized debt.266 
Despite the successful use of exit consents in exchange offers by Ecuador 
and other countries,267 this approach will likely not be viable in all 
circumstances.268  In many instances, “[t]he magnitude of the changes to 
the payment terms of the original bonds, particularly the reduction in the 
total principal amount of the bonds, necessary to relieve the sovereign 
debtor’s financial crisis may be so great as to prohibit an exchange from 
being economically feasible.”269  Additionally, a court may refuse to 
enforce an exit consent against holdouts, as was the case in Federated 
Strategic Income Fund and Assénagon.270  Further, some commentators 
argue that in some cases, the “buoying-up effect” of the restructuring may 
overcome the negative effects of the exit consents.271  When an exit consent 
is employed, a holding out bondholder retains the original bonds with the 
original payment terms but without the protective covenants, and by design 
the value of the original bond is subsequently reduced.272  Upon completion 
of the restructuring, however, the sovereign debtor’s total debt burden is 
reduced and the value of the bonds is thereby increased.273  This increase in 
value, the so-called “buoying-up” effect, may be greater than the decrease 
in value caused by the exit consents, rendering the exit consents 
ineffective.274 
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4.  Trust Structure and Majority Enforcement Provisions 
Most sovereign bonds issued in the United States are issued pursuant to a 
fiscal agency agreement that governs the relationship between the sovereign 
debtor and the fiscal agent, which is typically the investment bank serving 
as lead underwriter for the bond offering.275  Under a fiscal agency 
agreement, bondholders usually have the power to act individually in the 
event of a default on the bonds, including acceleration of the principal 
amount and suing to enforce the agreement.276  Jill Fisch and Caroline 
Gentile have suggested limiting disruptive holdout litigation by eliminating 
the right of individual bondholders to accelerate the principal amounts of 
their bonds in the event of a default.277  Instead, each bondholder might be 
limited to the right to sue the sovereign debtor only for unpaid interest and 
principal.  This change “would reduce the attractiveness of holdout 
litigation by sharply limiting the size of the judgment potentially available 
to a bondholder while simultaneously increasing the expense of pursuing 
the claim.”278  Such an arrangement would more closely resemble a trust 
indenture or trust deed, commonly used in the United Kingdom, under 
which the trustee, as agent for the bondholders, possesses the right to 
accelerate the principal amount of all the bonds and to sue the debtor for the 
total amount.279  Additionally, Fisch and Gentile suggest that bondholders’ 
unilateral power might be limited by contractually requiring the affirmative 
vote of a specified percentage of the outstanding bonds to commence any 
litigation against the debtor.280  A sharing clause could further discourage 
litigation by requiring that any amounts recovered via litigation must be 
shared with all bondholders on a pro rata basis.281  In a similar vein, a 
recent Note has advocated for the application of a “supertrustee” structure, 
which has been proposed in the corporate bond context,282 for sovereign 
bonds.283 
As with other contractual tools, holdout litigation may be successfully 
deterred by using some form of trust structure combined with a majority 
enforcement provision and a sharing clause.284  But larger problems of 
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overborrowing and restructuring too little and too late would remain.  And 
it is not clear that these kinds of contractual tools would make the 
restructuring process any more efficient, orderly, or transparent. 
C.  National Legislation 
Multilateral efforts to remedy problems presented by holdout litigation 
have been stalled, and contractual devices are of limited efficacy at best and 
require significant lead time (since outstanding bonds cannot be amended to 
contain novel contractual provisions).  This has led to demands for statutory 
reform at the national level.  Part II.C.1 outlines statutory proposals in 
Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States aimed at limiting 
recovery via holdout litigation against the world’s poorest countries.  Part 
II.C.2 discusses a statutory proposal designed to respond to the Second 
Circuit’s decision in NML Capital.285 
1.  Caps on Recovery Against Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
Antivulture fund laws, aimed at preventing holdouts from initiating legal 
action for recovery of debts from poor countries, have been introduced or 
enacted in countries where key international financial markets are centered, 
including Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  The thrust 
of these laws is limited and, in their current forms, do not provide a 
comprehensive solution for problems associated with sovereign debt 
restructurings.  Even if these laws became more expansive in their 
coverage, all countries where major international financial centers are 
located would need to enact substantially similar legislation. 
a.  Belgium 
In 2008, the Belgian senate unanimously approved a law designed to 
safeguard development cooperation funds from actions taken by vulture 
funds.286  The Belgian law inserts clauses into future bilateral agreements 
that prevent vulture funds from seizing Belgian aid that is set aside for 
specific projects.287  Because the Belgian law only covers bilateral loan 
agreements and does not touch other types of debt instruments, such as 
bond contracts, its present scope is particularly narrow. 
b.  The United Kingdom 
The Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act was enacted in the United 
Kingdom in 2010, and, in 2011, the U.K. Treasury ordered it permanent.288  
The law is designed to curb vulture creditor activity by limiting the 
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recovery available on the historically incurred debt of the 40 countries 
qualifying for the World Bank and IMF’s Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative (HIPC).289  The Act only applies to qualifying debt incurred 
before June 8, 2010.290  Although the U.K. law covers more debt 
instruments than its Belgian counterpart, it is only applicable to HIPCs.  
That means that the law does not cover an upper-middle-income country 
such as Argentina,291 still battling vulture funds that are trying to recover on 
debt incurred before June 8, 2010.  Furthermore, the U.K. law does not 
limit recovery on debt incurred after June 8, 2010. 
c.  The United States 
Congress has considered legislation to limit vulture fund recovery in the 
United States, but it failed to make it out of committee.292  A proposed bill 
would have prevented any private creditor holding defaulted sovereign debt, 
issued by a qualified poor country, from using litigation in a U.S. court to 
achieve payment of more than the total amount paid for the credit plus 6 
percent interest from the date the debt was acquired.293  Similar to its U.K. 
law counterpart, if passed, this legislation would only offer protection to a 
select group of poor countries. 
2.  Legislative Countermeasure to NML Capital 
A recent Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform 
(CIEPR) paper has proposed the adoption of legislation that immunizes 
payment and clearing systems in large financial centers from attachment or 
being otherwise blocked judicially.294  To be effective, substantially similar 
legislation must be adopted in the key financial centers where sovereign 
bonds are issued and traded.295  Such a limited reform may provide a 
solution to the problem of holdout creditors bolstered by the NML Capital 
decision,296 but it would only restore the status quo that existed prior to 
NML Capital.297  It would do nothing to address broader problems of 
overborrowing and restructuring too little and too late.298  And it would do 
nothing to make the restructuring process faster, more transparent, or more 
legitimate. 
 
 289. Press Release, Her Majesty’s Treasury, Government Acts To Halt Profiteering on 
Third World Debt Within the UK (May 16, 2011), available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/news/government-acts-to-halt-profiteering-on-third-world-debt-within-the-uk. 
 290. The Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act §§ 9–10. 
 291. Country and Lending Groups, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/about/
country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups#Upper_middle_income (last visited Mar. 
25, 2014). 
 292. Stop VULTURE Funds Act, H.R. 2932, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 293. Id. § 3(4); see also HR 2932 Legislative Leave Behind Packet, JUBILEE, 
http://www.jubileeusa.org/vulturefunds/leavebehindpacket.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 294. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 31–32. 
 295. Id. at 31–32. 
 296. See supra Part I.C.4. 
 297. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 31–32. 
 298. Id. at 32. 
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D.  Multilateral Arrangements 
This section examines multilateral arrangements for coordinating 
sovereign debt crises.  Part II.D.1 discusses proposals for a sovereign 
bankruptcy regime, including the proposals’ theoretical underpinnings, and 
Part II.D.2 briefly addresses the European Stability Mechanism. 
1.  Sovereign Bankruptcy 
Modern proposals for a formal bankruptcy framework for sovereign 
debtors have been debated since at least the early 1980s.299  The most 
widely discussed bankruptcy proposal is the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (SDRM) proposed by Anne Krueger of the IMF beginning in 
2001.300  Following the sovereign debt crises in the Eurozone and the NML 
Capital saga, the debate regarding sovereign bankruptcy has recently 
resumed in earnest.301  This section proceeds by first discussing 
fundamental bankruptcy principles.  Next, it discusses the IMF’s SDRM 
and some of the debate that followed.  The section concludes by outlining 
other proposals for sovereign bankruptcy. 
a.  Fundamental Bankruptcy Principles 
Insolvency presents a classic “common pool” or “prisoner’s dilemma” 
problem.302  Judge Richard Posner has explained that the reason for having 
involuntary as well as voluntary bankruptcy is to solve a transaction-cost 
problem that is created when there is a major default and many creditors.303  
When there are many creditors with conflicting claims, normal market 
mechanisms supported by normal contract enforcement in the courts, are 
unlikely to be efficient.304 
 
 299. See Das et al., supra note 11, at 88–92 (discussing various proposals for a sovereign 
bankruptcy regime); Oechsli, supra note 218; Rogoff & Zettelmeyer, supra note 25; see also 
supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 300. See, e.g., Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Architecture for 2002:  A New Approach to Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring (Nov. 26, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/
2001/112601.htm; ANNE O. KRUEGER, INT’L MONETARY FUND, A NEW APPROACH TO 
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING (2002); INT’L MONETARY FUND, PROPOSED FEATURES OF A 
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM (2003), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/021203.pdf [hereinafter INT’L MONETARY FUND, SDRM 
PROPOSED FEATURES]. 
 301. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, supra note 4, at 32–42; 
Gelpern, supra note 32; Panizza, supra note 218. 
 302. JACKSON, supra note 31, at 8–18; see also supra Part I.D. 
 303. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 14.5–.6 (1986). 
 304. Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at 7.  Sachs further 
explains: 
Consider the case of a corporation with many creditors which should be 
reorganized rather than liquidated.  Under normal contract law, each creditor is 
allowed to press its claim as soon as the enterprise fails to service the debts as they 
come due.  The creditors have an interest not only in staking a claim against the 
enterprise, but in doing so ahead of the other creditors.  This poses an enormous 
collective action problem for the creditors, in which all may lose. 
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Bankruptcy law exists to further “collectivization” goals—to give debtors 
a financial fresh start when warranted and to ensure that creditors do not 
worsen an already bad situation (insolvency) by engaging in a destructive 
race to the debtor’s assets.305  Bankruptcy regimes, as they have been 
formed in domestic legal systems, address the common pool problem by 
encompassing three central objectives:  (i) avoidance of a “run” on assets 
and holdout litigation; (ii) assurance of the payment of claims according to 
priority; and (iii) provision for the cancellation of unpaid claims following 
bankruptcy.306  The central goal of bankruptcy law is to maximize the 
efficiency of the conversion and restructuring process in order to inflict as 
little damage upon creditors as possible.307  In many cases, no outstanding 
debt is actually canceled.308 
Sovereign bankruptcy proposals are grounded in these fundamental 
bankruptcy law principles and are premised on the notion that the 
deadweight costs of sovereign debt crises are significantly related to 
coordination failures and free riding.  Coordination failures may delay and 
make it more difficult to resolve inevitable restructurings.  Timely and 
comprehensive restructurings may be obstructed by holdout litigation.  
Thus, proposals for sovereign bankruptcy procedures have focused on 
mechanisms that make a restructuring legally binding on holdouts and 
shield debtors from litigation while negotiations are ongoing. 
b.  Lessons from Municipal Bankruptcy in the United States 
Application of bankruptcy law principles to sovereigns is not 
unprecedented.  Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code extends the 
mechanism for corporate reorganization to municipalities.309  The three 
basic principles of Chapter 11 are included:  (1) the automatic stay,310 (2) 
debtor-in-possession financing,311 and (3) the possibility of confirmation of 
the reorganization plan by cramdown.312  But in Chapter 9, the Bankruptcy 
Code expressly recognizes that governments carry out political functions 
that financial distress should not impair.313  In particular, under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 904, courts may not interfere with:  (1) any of the political or 
governmental powers of the debtor; (2) any of the property or revenues of 
 
Id. 
 305. JACKSON, supra note 31, at 8–18. 
 306. Patrick Bolton, Toward a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring:  
Lessons from Corporate Bankruptcy Practice Around the World, 50 IMF STAFF PAPERS 43–
45 (2003). 
 307. Charles Seavey, Note, The Anomalous Lack of an International Bankruptcy Court, 
24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 499, 502 (2006). 
 308. Id. 
 309. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946 (2012). 
 310. Id. § 922. 
 311. Id. § 364; FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(c). 
 312. 11 U.S.C. §§ 943–944. 
 313. Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at 8–9; see also Sachs, 
Roadblock, supra note 54, at 75  (“The goal [of Chapter 9] is to preserve the functioning and 
the autonomy of the municipality due to the vital public services that it renders.”). 
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the debtor; or (3) the debtor’s use or enjoyment of any income-producing 
property.  According to Sachs, this provision indicates: 
The fact that the debtor is a government is not seen as a reason to forgo 
the relief of the bankruptcy law, but on the contrary, as a reason to 
strengthen the relief in order to maintain the political functions of the 
government, and to prevent the descent into the Hobbesian world, brought 
on by the financial weakness of the state.314 
c.  IMF’s SDRM Proposal 
The IMF’s proposed SDRM was aimed at providing a framework that 
reinforced incentives for a sovereign with unsustainable debt and its 
creditors to reach a swift and collaborative restructuring agreement in a way 
that preserves the economic value of assets and facilitates a return to 
medium-term sustainability.315  In recognition of the importance of 
sovereignty principles, the SDRM would have been activated by the debtor 
country.316  A key element of the SDRM was the “cram down” feature that 
would provide for a majority vote among creditors on a restructuring plan 
that would have bound a dissenting minority.317  But the IMF’s proposal 
did not provide for an automatic stay on litigation or an automatic cessation 
of payments, since the IMF staff took the position that in some instances it 
would not be necessary for a sovereign debtor to interrupt payments and 
because imposing a mandatory cessation on payments and a stay on 
litigation would incentivize creditors “to rush for the exit” when activation 
of the SDRM appeared imminent.318  Instead, a stay and cessation of 
payments would have been permitted if approved by 75 percent of 
outstanding creditors.319 
Under the IMF’s proposal, the Fund’s Executive Board would have made 
determinations about debt sustainability, but a dedicated Dispute Resolution 
Forum would have resolved other disputes.320  The IMF’s proposal 
provided incentives to induce interim financing by providing that new 
financing could be excluded from the restructuring if the extension of such 
financing was approved by 75 percent of outstanding creditors.321  The 
SDRM incorporated the Hotchpot rule—a principle in international 
solvency law that requires that any payment or asset collected by a creditor 
plaintiff through litigation must be offset against the plaintiff’s claim in the 
restructuring agreement.322  Notably, the IMF’s proposal provided for 
coordinating official bilateral debt and private debt either outside the 
 
 314. Sachs, International Lender of Last Resort, supra note 54, at 9. 
 315. INT’L MONETARY FUND, SDRM PROPOSED FEATURES, supra note 300, at 2. 
 316. Id. at 24. 
 317. Id. at 26. 
 318. Id. at 5. 
 319. Id. at 25. 
 320. Id. at 28. 
 321. Id. at 26. 
 322. Id. at 10, 25. 
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SDRM or as a separate creditor class.323  The proposal also contemplated 
imposing sanctions on debtor countries attempting to misuse the SDRM.324  
Finally, the IMF’s proposal included many technical provisions dealing 
with notification of creditors and registration and verification of claims.325 
Implementation of the SDRM would have required an amendment to the 
IMF Articles of Agreement, which requires approval by three-fifths of the 
member countries having 85 percent of the votes.326  Because the United 
States has more than 15 percent of the votes, it has a functional veto.327  
Thus, as a practical matter, any initiative that necessitates an amendment to 
the IMF Articles of Agreement must garner the support of the United States 
in order to be implemented. 
d.  Reception of the IMF’s SDRM Proposal 
In 2003, more than 70 percent of IMF member states supported the 
SDRM proposal,328 but some industrial countries and financial markets 
strongly opposed it.329  For the United States, a key concern was that the 
SDRM’s provisions would interfere with the contractual claims of U.S. 
investors.330  Another concern was that the jurisdiction of the proposed 
dispute resolution body, although limited, would have superseded that of 
U.S. courts during the restructuring process.331 
The private sector consistently warned that the SDRM, if adopted, would 
adversely affect the volume and price of capital to emerging market 
countries.332  Many market participants, including the banks that underwrite 
sovereign bonds, argued that the SDRM would have made it too easy for 
sovereigns to default.333  Emerging market sovereigns similarly objected, 
reasoning that if restructuring became easier, credit would become more 
expensive.334  Patrick Bolton and David Skeel argued that the evidence 
suggested these concerns were overstated, since countries are reluctant to 
default on their debt and, due to reputational concerns, do so only as a last 
 
 323. Id. at 4. 
 324. Id. at 27. 
 325. Id. at 23–29. 
 326. Id. at 17; see also Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. 
XXVIII, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (as amended effective Mar. 3, 2011), 
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 327. See IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx (last updated 
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 328. Ed Bartholomew et al., Two-Step Sovereign Debt Restructuring:  A Market-Based 
Approach in a World Without International Bankruptcy Law, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 859, 859 
(2004). 
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resort.335  Furthermore, empirical evidence indicates there is a significant 
overborrowing problem on the part of many sovereigns, which suggests that 
tighter borrowing constraints, in the form of more expensive capital, would 
actually improve welfare.336 
Another central criticism of the design of the SDRM was the IMF’s 
role.337  Under the SDRM, the IMF would have continued to lend to crisis-
afflicted countries, it would have determined debt sustainability for 
purposes of approving a restructuring plan, and it would have housed the 
tribunal for adjudicating disputes.338  But as a major “priority” lender, the 
IMF may have had a conflict of interest in assuring its own debt was 
repaid.339  Fairness under the IMF’s SDRM was a major concern since 
official bilateral lending would either have been negotiated outside of the 
SDRM or as a separate creditor class.340  Furthermore, the major creditor 
country members dominate the IMF and its decisionmaking, and as such, 
the Fund is not an impartial institution.341  Amid controversy and criticism 
and without the support of the United States, the IMF’s SDRM was never 
implemented. 
e.  Sovereign Bankruptcy Back on the Table?:   
Sovereign Debt Adjustment Program 
Recently, a group of sovereign debt experts have advocated for the 
formation of what they call a Sovereign Debt Adjustment Program (SDAP) 
based within the IMF.342  The SDAP is premised on the idea that 
governments should be discouraged from delaying necessary restructurings 
by relying on borrowing from official lenders, and that this can be 
accomplished by making the restructuring process less risky and more 
predictable.343  Its proponents argue that the only “practical” way of 
achieving that is through a modification to the way in which the IMF assists 
countries with unsustainable levels of debt.344  The CIEPR proposal 
advocates for the establishment of what they call a Sovereign Debt 
 
 335. Bolton & Skeel, supra note 333, at 766; see also supra Part I.A.2. 
 336. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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Adjustment Facility (SDAF) that would be dedicated to assisting high-debt 
countries.345 
Meeting the SDAF criteria would trigger a two-step procedure.346  In the 
first step, a debtor country could request a traditional adjustment program, 
and if certain country-specific criteria were met, the IMF would be 
prohibited from lending further unless the country’s debt also underwent a 
restructuring.347  The second step would be the debt restructuring.348  The 
key difference between this proposed process and the status quo is that, 
under its current rules, the Fund has broad leeway to adjust conditionality 
and continue lending even after programs go off track.349  Under an SDAF, 
this leeway would be restricted to support programs only if they include a 
restructuring of the distressed sovereign’s existing debt.350 
The SDAF would commence with a request from a debtor country.351  
Upon accepting the request, the IMF would prepare a draft Debt 
Sustainability Analysis (DSA).352  The DSA would be based on principles 
of equitable burden sharing across all creditor classes, except for 
multilateral lending institutions, trade and supplier creditors, and similar 
commonly recognized exceptions.353  The DSA would be disclosed 
publicly, discussed with the debtor country, and comments would be invited 
from civil society groups.354  The debtor country would then use the DSA 
in negotiating with its creditor groups, and the IMF would review the 
ultimate restructuring proposal.355  The final restructuring proposal would 
then require the approval of holders of 75 percent of impacted debt 
instruments.356 
The CIEPR proposal contemplates dealing with holdouts by 
“immunizing” the assets of the debtor country against attachment in all IMF 
member countries by a holder of a debt instrument that was invited to 
participate in a Fund-approved SDAF but declined to do so.357  This reform 
would be accomplished by amending the IMF’s Articles of Agreement.358  
This change would not directly impact creditor rights, but enforcement of a 
judgment against a sovereign debtor would become impracticable.  Thus, 
under this proposal a creditor like NML Capital could still hale Argentina 
into a U.S. court and obtain a judgment, but it would not be able to enforce 
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such a judgment by, for example, obtaining an injunction blocking the 
movement of an Argentine military vessel.359 
The SDAF proposal is appealing in that it would be a less dramatic 
change to the status quo than the SDRM.  Implementation would be 
relatively simple, particularly since it would not require the creation of a 
new international organization.  But, to quote the CIEPR authors 
themselves, “by requiring less, they also achieve less.”360  In particular, 
basing the SDAF at the IMF would have the same institutional bias 
problems as the SDRM.361 
2.  European Stability Mechanism 
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was born out of broad 
dissatisfaction with the ad hoc and inefficient management of the recent 
Greek debt restructuring and the subsequent spillover effects experienced 
throughout Europe.362  The ESM establishes a fund to provide conditional 
financial assistance to member countries experiencing severe financing 
problems.363  Gelpern has described the ESM as a “proto-bankruptcy 
regime,”364 but it has also been called a “permanent bail-out fund.”365  The 
ESM does nothing to address overborrowing problems—if anything it will 
exasperate them since its very existence may increase moral hazard366—nor 
does it address holdout problems in a comprehensive way.367  Thus, it is not 
clear that the ESM provides an adequate solution for the Eurozone, much 
less a model to be replicated elsewhere. 
III.  A FULL-FLEDGED SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY REGIME OFFERS THE 
BEST POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENT TO THE STATUS QUO 
For most of the nineteenth century, as Jeffrey Sachs explains, classic 
bank runs occurred regularly despite the fact that Henry Thornton 
recognized the fundamental solution to these runs as early as 1802,368 
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which were further developed and promoted by Walter Bagehot in 1873.369  
Only gradually, two primary institutions evolved in domestic economies:  
(1) the role of the central bank as lender of last resort; and (2) state-run 
deposit insurance.370  Both institutions required considerable time and 
debate before being established and widely accepted.371  For example, in 
the United States, the Federal Reserve System was not established until 
1913, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was not launched until 
1933.372  The utility of both institutions was extensively debated right up to 
their adoption and application.373  Today, many observers consider the 
adoption of federal deposit insurance to be the key tool in ending the 
periodic bank panics in the United States,374 and no mainstream economist 
would question the utility of a central bank.375  Sachs further explains that 
the historical record clearly indicates that a variety of private market 
responses to bank panics had been chronically insufficient for more than a 
century in taming the sporadic outbreak of deep and costly crises.376  This 
has also been the case with sovereign debt crises.377  Decades of experience 
with ad hoc deals and private contractual tools in the modern era of 
sovereign debt crises have established a similar record of persistent 
failure.378  And as was the case with bank panics, the establishment of an 
effective and comprehensive legal institution is necessary to correct these 
costly market failures. 
The current ad hoc regime for coordinating and resolving sovereign debt 
crises is unpredictable, messy, inefficient, and it lacks legitimacy.379  
Contractual devices fail to provide a comprehensive solution.380  And in the 
absence of a comprehensive solution, collective action problems go 
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unmitigated,381 the overborrowing problem persists,382 and the well-
documented problems of restructuring too little and too late remain.383 
A.  Goals of Reform 
Reform should try to achieve four central goals384:  (1) correct 
overborrowing and mispricing of risk by providing a predictable, orderly, 
and transparent regime that limits official sector participation (i.e., bailouts) 
and corrects the incomplete contracting problem;385 (2) provide legitimacy 
for sovereign debt restructurings where debt is unsustainable, thereby 
removing incentives for sovereigns to delay restructuring;386 (3) provide an 
efficient debt restructuring framework that reduces the deadweight costs 
associated with debt workouts and does not leave sovereigns with too much 
debt;387 and (4) overcome coordination failures and eliminate holdout 
risks.388 
B.  An International Bankruptcy Court Is the Best Solution 
These goals can best be accomplished by establishing a rules-based 
sovereign bankruptcy regime through a multilateral treaty organization.  
International institutions should provide public goods that are not provided 
by the market.  They should provide an international legal framework for 
overcoming problems of market failure, analogous to domestic institutions 
that provide that role within national economies.  In the realm of financial 
insolvency of sovereign borrowers, the existing international institutional 
framework is inadequate.  The creation of a new treaty-based institution 
could therefore help to improve the efficiency of international capital 
markets and promote global economic stability by better addressing these 
sources of market failure.  Both debtor and creditor countries would benefit 
from the formation of a sovereign bankruptcy court or tribunal. 
The international bankruptcy regime should include the traditional 
features of bankruptcy law.389  These include a standstill on payments and 
creditor enforcement once the mechanism has been initiated, the payment of 
claims according to priority, the possibility of obtaining interim financing, 
and the ability to enforce the restructuring plan by the approval of a 
majority of creditors.  Furthermore, in order to achieve a standstill and 
enforce an effective restructuring plan, the jurisdiction of the tribunal 
should apply to both domestic and foreign creditors. 
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As prior experience has demonstrated, debtor and creditor countries may 
continue to be wary of the establishment of an international bankruptcy 
court.390  To address some of the concerns of reluctant debtor countries, the 
bankruptcy treaty must provide reassurance that the participating states’ 
sovereignty will be preserved.  Any treaty establishing an international 
bankruptcy tribunal should include protections akin to those of Chapter 9 of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which expressly prohibit the court from 
interfering with the government’s political and economic powers.391 
The key advantage of a full-fledged bankruptcy regime would be 
comprehensiveness.  Closely related to this would be the compulsory nature 
of the process, meaning that creditors would be unable to decline 
participation, and holdouts would no longer present a problem.  
Furthermore, process centralization in the form of a single forum, with a 
single set of rules, and claims paid out of a single set of assets, would be 
advantageous, particularly for predictability and efficiency purposes.392  
Finally, the greater likelihood of achieving an equitable outcome that is 
viable for the medium-term would increase the legitimacy of the institution. 
Because of institutional bias problems,393 a sovereign bankruptcy regime 
should be established outside the IMF.  Some experts argue that the IMF is 
the only institution with sufficient expertise and capacity to carry out the 
complex task of navigating sovereign debt crises.  But who would endorse 
the idea of creditor banks acting as the arbiter of collection actions in 
domestic bankruptcy law?394  Could a tribunal structured this way be 
expected to reach an equitable and legitimate outcome?  Certainly not. 
Perhaps the chief criticism to a treaty proposal is that achieving it would 
be difficult, if not impossible.  Implementation of a sovereign bankruptcy 
treaty would require domestic legislation in most member countries.  
However, simply because something would be difficult to achieve is a poor 
reason for not trying to do so. 
Another criticism of the formation of a sovereign bankruptcy regime is 
that it may result in higher capital costs.  However, this concern is 
overstated.  As discussed above in Parts I.B.1 and II.D.1.d, empirical 
evidence suggests that many countries overborrow above a socially optimal 
amount.395  Therefore, tighter borrowing constraints in the form of higher 
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capital costs would actually be a desirable result since it would correct this 
market distortion. 
C.  Potential Starting Points for Treaty Negotiations 
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) dispute resolution body 
regularly decides complex trade disputes through compulsory adjudications 
that are largely deemed apolitical.396  Thus, the WTO could provide a 
model for an international bankruptcy tribunal and, potentially, a starting 
point for treaty negotiations.  A significant difference between an 
international bankruptcy tribunal and the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism is that the WTO adjudicates disputes between states, while a 
bankruptcy tribunal would adjudicate disputes among states and private 
creditors.  However, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal provides a 
precedent and model for an international tribunal with jurisdiction to 
resolve disputes between states or between states and private creditors.397 
Treaty negotiations could also be initiated by the United Nations.  For 
example, in May 2003, following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 
Iraq, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1483.398  Among other 
things, that resolution encouraged the new government in Iraq to restructure 
the debt stock it inherited from its predecessor regime, and it temporarily 
immunized all petroleum assets of Iraq against “any form of attachment, 
garnishment, or execution” and similarly protected the proceeds of Iraqi oil 
sales.399  Resolution 1483 was enacted pursuant to Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, and thus bound all members of the 
organization.  Although the scope of Resolution 1483 is significantly 
narrower than the formation of a comprehensive international bankruptcy 
mechanism, it provides a precedent for the United Nations using its 
authority to facilitate the orderly resolution of an international sovereign 
debt dilemma.400  The United Nations could certainly provide a forum and 
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jumping-off point for the formation of a formal international bankruptcy 
regime.401 
Alternatively, a country that has already demonstrated an interest in 
taking the lead on addressing issues related to sovereign debt crises, such as 
Belgium, could lead treaty negotiations.402  However, it is not clear that 
Belgium, or any other country, is interested in taking on this leadership role 
at this time. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note described sovereign debt markets, crises, and related legal 
issues.  It discussed various proposals for dealing with these problems in 
sovereign debt markets, and concluded that a multilateral treaty-based 
sovereign bankruptcy regime would provide the best solution for 
coordinating sovereign debt crises.  Formal sovereign bankruptcy is the 
only way to fully solve the incomplete contracting problem inherent in 
sovereign debt and to effectively mitigate collective action problems.  
Furthermore, a well-designed comprehensive bankruptcy regime would 
correct many of the distortions and failures in sovereign debt markets, such 
as overborrowing, mispricing of risk, and restructuring too little and too 
late.  While obstacles to implementation of a sovereign bankruptcy regime, 
including lack of political will, would certainly be formidable, that is not a 
legitimate reason for abandoning an otherwise desirable goal. 
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